地方政府竞争、税收任务与税收超收——来自2008—2015年全国税收调查的经验证据  

Local Government Competition,Tax Revenue Target,and Tax Over-collection:Evidence from National Tax Survey from 2008 to 2015

作　　者：侯石安[1] 谷雨 HOU ShiAn;GU Yu(Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073;NingboTech University,Ningbo 315100)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学,湖北武汉430073 [2]浙大宁波理工学院,浙江宁波315100

出　　处：《财贸研究》2023年第3期80-93,共14页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：教育部高等学校学科创新引智计划(B20084)的资助。

摘　　要：基于2008—2015年中国税收调查数据,探讨地方政府面临的税收任务对企业税收超收的影响。研究表明:地方政府当年的税收任务设定值越高,对企业的税收超收越严重;地方政府竞争越激烈,税收任务对企业税收超收的提升效应越弱。地区异质性分析表明,税收任务对企业税收超收的提升效应在完成税收任务的压力大、财政自给率高以及东、中部地区更显著;企业异质性分析表明,税收任务对税收超收的效应在内资企业、政治关联程度弱的企业、小微企业以及隶属于地方税务局征管的企业中更为明显。为此,应完善地方官员绩效考核制度、优化税收任务的编制方式,以提升企业税收激励作用。Based on the national tax survey data from 2008 to 2015,the paper explores the impact of local government taxation tasks on enterprise tax over-collection.The study concludes that the higher the tax revenue target set by local governments in the current year,the more serious the tax over-collection on companies.The more intense the competition between local governments,the weaker the boosting effect of tax revenue target on enterprise tax over-collection.The analysis of regional heterogeneity shows that the boosting effect of tax tasks on corporate tax over-collection is more significant in regions with high pressure to complete tax tasks,high fiscal self-sufficiency rate,and in the eastern and central regions.Enterprise heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect of tax task on tax over-collection is more pronounced in domestic enterprises,enterprises with weak political affiliation,small and micro enterprises,and enterprises under the control of local tax bureaus.To this end,the performance appraisal system for local officials and the optimization of the compilation of taxation tasks should be improved to enhance the incentive effect of corporate taxation.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 税收任务 税收超收 企业税负 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]