基于不完全契约理论的规划博弈研究——以上海陆家嘴和前滩开发为例  

Research on Game for Planning Powers Based on Incomplete Contract Theory:A Case of Lujiazui and Front Bund in Shanghai

作　　者：朱揆 Zhu Kui

机构地区：[1]上海同济城市规划设计研究院有限公司

出　　处：《城市建筑》2023年第7期127-132,144,共7页Urbanism and Architecture

摘　　要：伴随着土地市场化改革,中国城市规划迅速成为显学,也因在实践中屡屡向市场“妥协”而饱受诟病。基于将规划权视为源于土地国家所有权的剩余控制权这一判断,文章提出规划调整是规划博弈的表象,规划作为不完全契约得到实施的正常过程,不应被排除在规划研究的一般性框架之外。文章选取上海浦东陆家嘴金融贸易区和前滩国际商务区的案例进行实证研究,试图分析土地使用权和规划权的初始配置对规划博弈过程和结果的影响,提出应当通过制度设计引导规划博弈产生有效率的结果,而非试图完全消灭。Along with the land marketization reform,China’s urban planning has rapidly become a famous subject,but also has been criticized for repeatedly“compromising”to the market in practice.Based on the judgement that planning powers function as residual control rights that derive from the party-state’s ownership of urban land,the paper proposes that planning adjustments are the appearance of game for planning powers.As normal process for the implementation of incomplete contract,planning adjustment should not be excluded from the general interpretation framework of urban planning studies.The paper takes the development of Lujiazui Financial and Trade District and Front Bund International Business District in Shanghai Pudong New District as cases,attempts to analyze the influence of the initial distribution of land-use rights and planning powers on the process and result of game for planning powers,and proposes that we should guide the game for planning powers to effective results through institutional design,rather than try to eliminate the competition.

关 键 词：规划博弈 不完全契约 制度变迁 新区开发 

分 类 号：TU981[建筑科学—城市规划与设计]