农村违法占地与基层干部寻租的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Illegal Land Use in Rural Areas and Rent-Seeking by Grass-Roots Cadres

作　　者：王嘉诚 周根贵[1] 綦方中[1] WANG Jia-cheng;ZHOU Gen-gui;QI Fang-zhong(School of Management,Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou 310023,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学管理学院,浙江杭州310023

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2023年第3期106-116,共11页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(18BJY148);国家自然科学基金(71371169)。

摘　　要：乡村振兴背景下我国农村宅基地价值不断提升,农民建房需求大幅增加,但建设用地指标紧缺且审批复杂,因此滋生出农户违法占地与基层干部寻租现象.构建演化博弈模型,研究了在无政府监察与政府监察的情形下农户与基层干部群体在违法占地现象中的策略选择问题,依据不同情况求出相应均衡解并得到相应结论;然后结合河南省部分农村违法占地案例,运用仿真计算对其进行分析并验证相关结论;最后站在政府部门的角度提出政策建议,力图遏制农村违法占地与干部寻租现象,推动我国农村经济高质高效发展.Under the background of rural revitalization,the value of rural homestead is constantly improving,and farmers'demand for building houses is greatly increasing.However,the shortage of construction land index and the complicated examination and approval result in the phenomenon of farmers'illegal land use and rent-seeking by grassroots cadres.In this paper,an evolutionary game model is constructed to study the strategy choice of farmers and grassroots cadres in illegal land occupation under the situation of anarchy supervision and government supervision.The corresponding equilibrium solution is obtained according to different situations and corresponding conclusions are obtained.Then combined with some cases of illegal land occupation in rural areas of Henan Province,simulation calculation was used to analyze and verify the relevant conclusions.Finally,it puts forward some policy suggestions from the point of view of government departments,so as to curb the illegal land area and rent-seeking of cadres in rural areas,and promote the high-quality and efficient development of our rural economy.

关 键 词：干部寻租 违法占地 演化博弈 政府监察 

分 类 号：D262.3[政治法律—政治学] F224.32[政治法律—中共党史] F321.1[经济管理—国民经济]