论哈特之道:作为理由的法律与作为事实的法律  

On Hart’s Ways:Law as Reason and as Fact

作　　者： 杨建(译)[2,3] John Finnis;Yang Jian

机构地区：[1]牛津大学 [2]南京师范大学法学院 [3]中国法治现代化研究院

出　　处：《荆楚法学》2023年第1期141-160,共20页Jingchu Law Review

基　　金：2018年教育部青年基金项目“美好生活的法理意涵与法理论述体系建构”(项目编号:18YJC820081)的阶段性成果;国家留学基金的资助。

摘　　要：这是当代最重要的自然法学者约翰·菲尼斯教授对最重要的法实证主义大师哈特教授的法理论的系统梳理与批判。菲尼斯教授将哈特的法理论划分为两大部分,分别对应哈特法哲学中的实证理论与规范理论。全文致力于阐述这套理论的一般方法论,论文重点论述了哈特的参照内在观点的方法与核心事例的方法,向学界清楚地呈现了哈特法理论的优秀哲学品质与杰出理论贡献之所在。在此基础之上,菲尼斯教授运用哈特法理论的核心方法论,分析批判哈特法理论的理论缺失,指出哈特法理论在一般方法论上的不彻底之处,以及相应在实证理论与规范理论之间人为制造的断裂,并为如何改进提供了自己的理论方案。This paper is from Professor John Finnis, the foremost contemporary natural law scholar, emeritus professor of Oxford University and professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. In this paper, Finnis presents a systematic review and critique of Professor H.L.A. Hart’s legal theory, who was the leading giant of legal philosophy, master of legal positivism. Professor Finnis divides Hart’s legal theory into two major parts, corresponding to the positive theory and the normative theory of Hart’s legal philosophy. The whole paper is devoted to the general methodology of Hart’s legal theory, focusing on Hart’s two key methodological approaches— the internal point of view and the central case analysis, and presenting the excellent philosophical merits and outstanding theoretical contributions of Hart’s legal theory. On this basis, Professor Finnis uses Hart’s core methodological concepts to analyze and criticize the theoretical shortcomings of Hart’s theory, pointing out the incompleteness of Hart’s theory in general methodology and the corresponding theoretical break between positive and normative parts. In the end, professor Finnis provides his own theoretical solutions for a better legal theory.

关 键 词：哈特 法哲学 一般方法论 法实证主义批判 

分 类 号：D90[政治法律—法学理论]