How do international agreement constraints affect marine litter management strategies?A research based on differential game  

作　　者：LENG Jie QI Xin CAO Zeng 

机构地区：[1]School of Management Science and Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,CHINA [2]School of Life Sciences,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058,CHINA [3]Hangzhou Institute of Applied Acoustics,Hangzhou 311400,CHINA

出　　处：《Ecological Economy》2023年第1期27-43,共17页生态经济（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the Qihang Project of Zhejiang University(Grant No.202016)。

摘　　要：Based on differential game theory,the decision-making problem of two homogeneous countries facing transboundary marine litter governance is studied.On the basis of assuming that the input of marine litter is an exogenous variable,the focus is on reducing the accumulation of marine litter through cleanup and transfer processing by both parties.Considering the constant and increasing input of marine litter,in the framework of international agreement constraints,the analysis of the game behavior of the players in the marine litter governance under the open-loop strategy(in the case of agreement constraints)and the Markov strategy(in the case of no agreement constraints)was compared and analyzed.The research results show that when the direct pollution cost of marine litter is high enough,both sides of the game adopt an open-loop strategy that complies with the constraints of the agreement,which can reduce the accumulation of marine litter and improve the environmental quality.However,when there is a high initial accumulation of marine litter,the Markov strategy without protocol constraints will be better than the open-loop strategy.In the case that marine litter does not need to be transferred,there will be no difference between the two sides of the game adopting the Markov strategy and adopting the open-loop strategy on the equilibrium growth path.

关 键 词：arine litter governance clean-up strategy differential game protocol constraints 

分 类 号：X55[环境科学与工程—环境工程]