Interactive information disclosure and non-penalty regulatory review risk  

作　　者：Meng Wang Yongjie Zhang Yizhe Dong Gaofeng Zou Wanlong Zhao 

机构地区：[1]College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin,300072,China [2]Business School,University of Edinburgh,Edinburgh,EH89YL,UK

出　　处：《Journal of Management Science and Engineering》2023年第1期149-166,共18页管理科学学报（英文版）

基　　金：National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71790594,72071142 and 72271184).

摘　　要：Using monthly data from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's‘Hudongyi’platform and comment letters from December 2014 to December 2018,this study investigates the influence of interactive information disclosure on non-penalty regulatory review risk.The findings reveal that the richness and activeness of interactive information disclosure are positively associated with regulatory review risk.Moreover,the non-penalty regulatory review is effective as it significantly reduces the probability of receiving a comment letter in the subsequent three periods.The timeliness of interactive information disclosure is negatively associated with regulatory review risks.Additionally,we find that newspaper media coverage partially mediates the relationship between interactive information disclosure and regulatory review risk.For companies with low levels of internal governance,in low-competitive industries,and state-owned companies,the positive relationship between the number of investor questions and regulatory review risk is strengthened.These findings enrich the literature on the determinants of regulatory review risk and the economic consequences of interactive information disclosure in emerging markets.

关 键 词：‘Hudongyi’online communication system Comment letters Interactive information disclosure Regulatory review risk 

分 类 号：X799.5[环境科学与工程—环境工程]