重污染行业碳信息披露行为机理与评价机制研究  

Research on the Behavior Mechanism and Evaluation Mechanism of Carbon Information Disclosure in Heavy Pollution Industries

作　　者：高涵洋 姚晶晶[1] 俞懿玲 王璇[1] GAO Hanyang;YAO Jingjing;YU Yiling;WANG Xuan(Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang,Jiangsu 212000)

机构地区：[1]江苏大学,江苏镇江212000

出　　处：《中国商论》2023年第9期135-138,共4页China Journal of Commerce

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目“互联网金融背景下绿色金融信息的传播机理与风险防范研究”(2021SJZDA139);江苏大学大学生创新创业训练项目(202210299472X)。

摘　　要：“十四五”以来,随着“双碳”目标纳入经济社会发展全局,维护碳市场稳定,确保碳交易正规化、透明化,防范碳数据造假已然成为当前的热点话题。然而,我国目前仍存在碳信息法律制度不健全、企业碳信息披露度不高、部门监管不力等诸多问题。因此,本文立足于重污染行业的碳信息披露行为,以博弈论为基础,通过研究该行业与政府、投资者之间的双向影响,分析重污染企业的行为机理。同时,为重污染行业碳信息披露建立科学合理的评价机制,评判企业碳信息披露质量,以期有助于加快实现绿色低碳发展的社会目标。Since"the 14th Five-Year Plan",with the"double carbon"goal included in our economic and social development,maintaining the stability of the carbon market,ensuring the normalization and transparency of carbon trading,and preventing carbon data fraud has become a hotspot.However,there are still many problems in China’s carbon information disclosure procedures,such as the incomplete carbon information legal system,the low degree of corporate carbon information disclosure,and the weak supervision of regulatory authorities.As a result,based on the carbon information disclosure behavior of the heavy pollution industry and the game theory,this article analyzes their behavior mechanism by studying the two-way influence between the industry,the government and investors.At the same time,it establishes a scientific and reasonable evaluation mechanism for carbon information disclosure in heavy pollution industries to evaluate the quality of corporate carbon information disclosure,in order to help accelerate the realization of the social goal of green and low-carbon development.

关 键 词：重污染行业 碳信息披露 博弈论 披露行为机理 评价机制 

分 类 号：F124.5[经济管理—世界经济]