基于演化博弈的水权交易双方行为策略选择及案例仿真  

Bilateral behavior strategy choice and case simulation of water rights trading based on evolutionary game

作　　者：田贵良[1,2,3] 胡豪 景晓栋 TIAN Guiliang;HU Hao;JING Xiaodong(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing Jiangsu 211100,China;School of Economics and Finance,Hohai University,Nanjing Jiangsu 211100,China;Yangtze Institute for Conservation and Development,Nanjing Jiangsu 210098,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100 [2]河海大学经济与金融学院,江苏南京211100 [3]长江保护与绿色发展研究院,江苏南京210098

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2023年第4期184-195,共12页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家重点研发计划课题“梯级水库群水沙-生态-经济多目标协同调控技术”(批准号:2021YFC3200403);国家社会科学基金重大项目“跨境水资源确权与分配方法及保障体系研究”(批准号:17ZDA064);国家自然科学基金项目“合同节水管理中不确定风险评估、收益分配机制和节水效益评价”(批准号:61873084)。

摘　　要：水资源短缺是中国的基本国情,人口增长和气候变化将进一步加剧这一问题。水权交易是缓解水资源短缺和利用效率不足的一种经济手段,能够有效促成水资源的优化配置。由于水权交易双方的策略选择直接影响水权交易的效率,该研究基于演化博弈对水权交易的相关参数进行了系统分析。首先,考虑到市场竞争环境对水权交易效率的影响,该研究假设市场竞争是导致谈判破裂的主要因素,基于具有破裂风险的议价模型建立了交易双方的收益矩阵,并分析了不同情况下平衡点的位置、稳定性和系统演化机制。其次,为了强调初始策略点对博弈结果的重要影响,该研究以双方潜在合作者的数量描述了相对竞争条件,并据此确定了博弈系统的初始策略点。在此基础上,运用演化博弈理论分析了双方策略选择的稳定性。最后,借助MATLAB对中宁县与京能中宁电厂间的水权交易案例进行仿真分析。研究结果表明,交易水量、受让方水资源利用水平及市场竞争等因素对交易价格具有重要影响,且(1)当水权受让方的需求量过低时,若水权转让方节约的水权不能有效拆分,会影响水权交易效率。当水权受让方的需求过高时,综合补偿成本的急剧增大将直接抬高转让方的预期价格,同样会影响水权交易效率。(2)当交易价格等条件给定时,受让方的用水效率与水权交易博弈系统的收敛速度成正比。(3)当水权受让方的用水效率较高时,可以适当提高水权交易的价格,在实现水资源有偿使用的同时,保障水权转让方的财产性收入。(4)当交易价格等条件给定时,水权交易市场的参与者数目越多,越有利于水权交易的达成。Water resource shortages have become a national issue in China.Population growth and climate change tend to further ag⁃gravate this problem.Water rights trading is an economic means for alleviating the shortages and inefficient utilization of water resourc⁃es and effectively promoting their optimal allocation.As the strategy choice of both parties of the trading directly affects the efficiency of water rights trading,this paper systematically analyzes the relevant parameters affecting the bilateral strategy choice of water rights trad⁃ing based on the evolutionary game theory.First,given the impact of the market competition environment on the efficiency of water rights trading,this paper assumes that market competition is the major risk factor leading to the breakdown of negotiations;establishes the income matrix of both sides of water rights trading based on the bargaining model with the risk of breakdown;and analyzes the posi⁃tion,stability,and system evolution mechanism of the equilibrium point under different circumstances.Second,to emphasize the impor⁃tant influence of the initial strategy point on the equilibrium result of the evolutionary game,this paper describes the relative competi⁃tion conditions according to the number of potential partners on both sides and further determines the initial strategy point of the game system.On this basis,the stability of the bilateral strategy choice is analyzed by using evolutionary game theory.Finally,the case of wa⁃ter rights trading between Zhongning City and Jingneng Power Plant is simulated and analyzed with the help of MATLAB.The results show that the trading water volume,the water resource utilization level of the transferee,and market competition have a significant im⁃pact on the transaction price,and:①The efficiency of water rights trading will be affected when the demand of the transferee for water rights is too low and the water rights saved by the transferor cannot be effectively split.On the contrary,the sharp increase in the com⁃prehen

关 键 词：水权交易 演化博弈 议价模型 破裂风险 交易价格 

分 类 号：TV213.4[水利工程—水文学及水资源]