非对称竞争下的电商动态定价策略  

Dynamic Price Strategy of E-commerce in Asymmetric Competition

作　　者：张昊[1] ZHANG Hao(National Academy of Economic Strategy,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院财经战略研究院,100006

出　　处：《经济研究》2023年第2期158-174,共17页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“发挥居民消费推动传统产业转型升级的基础性作用研究”(20BJY101)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文考察了处于不对称强弱关系中的电商动态定价策略,并分析其竞争效应,结果表明:电商可以通过高低定价实现对急需型顾客的价格歧视,并利用低价匹配策略削弱竞争对手的降价意愿,从而在动态价格调整中产生协调效果,抬高面向不同顾客群体的均衡价格。从竞争效应看,相比独家经营情形,存在低价匹配策略的非对称双寡头博弈均衡中,优势电商在高、低两个价位的定价水平总是更低,而弱势电商的定价则有可能相同甚至更高。使用2020年8月至2022年1月在京东、苏宁按月采集的四大类家电产品的型号、价格及市场进入退出数据进行经验分析,印证了有关定价行为特征及竞争效应的理论推断。本文深化了对电商复合定价行为的认识,对优化线上市场具有启示意义。The rapid development of e-commerce in China is remarkable.With the gradual intensification of online market competition,various new phenomena and new features emerge endlessly.China's online market adjusts prices frequently and in large range,and there are both price matching and price dispersion phenomena.In recent years,the“center+fringe”structure has gradually formed,and the market power of e-commerce behemoths has been differentiated.The sophisticated pricing strategy caused by asymmetric competition is further intertwined with the above phenomenon.This paper examines the dynamic pricing strategy of e-commerce in an asymmetric competition,and analyzes its competitive effect.The results show that e-commerce can conduct price discrimination against customers in urgent need through high-low pricing,and weaken the willingness of competitors to reduce prices through low price matching strategy,thus forming a coordination effect conducive to implicit collusion in the dynamic price adjustment and raising the balanced price for different customer groups in equilibrium.From the perspective of competitive effect,compared with the exclusive selling situation,in a variety of asymmetric duopoly game equilibria with low price matching strategy,the pricing level of the powerful e-commerce is always lower at the high and low prices,while the pricing of the non-powerful e-commerce is likely to be the same or even higher.Based on the model,price and market entry and exit data of the four major categories of household appliances,namely,refrigerators,washing machines,televisions,and air conditioners,collected monthly in JD and Suning from August 2020 to January 2022,the empirical analysis supports the theoretical inference.The conclusion of this paper means that the online market price information is more transparent,and the price adjustment can lead to lower menu cost and faster speed,which may not only intensify the price competition,but create conditions for implicit collusion between businesses.Implicit collusion exists

关 键 词：电商 价格歧视 高低定价 价格匹配 隐性合谋 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济]