基于演化博弈的被动式建筑产业化发展驱动策略研究  

Research on Driving Strategy of Passive Building Industrialization Development Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：常人龙 滕佳颖[1] CHANG Renlong;TENG Jiaying(School of Economics and Management,Jilin Jianzhu University,Changchun 130118,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林建筑大学经济与管理学院,吉林长春130118

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2023年第2期25-30,共6页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：吉林省社会科学基金项目(2020B095)。

摘　　要：在“双碳”目标视域下,发展被动式建筑有助于节约资源、保护环境,推动建筑业绿色转型升级,促进经济可持续发展。为推进被动式建筑产业化发展,选取政府和开发商为博弈主体,运用演化博弈理论对被动式建筑市场中的主导关系进行分析,揭示政府与开发商之间的动态互动关系,并构建演化博弈及系统动力学模型,探究驱动被动式建筑产业化发展的有效因素。结果表明,开发商增量成本(D3)的减少、政府补贴(S)与惩罚(P)的增加均可促进开发商开发被动式建筑。其中降低开发商的增量成本效果最好,政府的补贴次之,给予开发商惩罚的效果一般。In the perspective of the"dual carbon"goal,the development of passive buildings helps to save resources,protect the environment,promote the green transformation and upgrading of the construction industry,and promote sustainable economic development.To promote the industrial development of passive buildings,the paper selects the government and developers as the main players of the game,uses the evolutionary game theory to analyze the dominant relationship in the passive building market,reveals the dynamic interactive relationship between the government and developers,and constructs the evolutionary game model and system dynamics model to explore the effective factors driving the industrial development of passive buildings.The results show that the reduction of incremental costs(D3)and the increase of government subsidies(S)and penalties(P)can promote the development of passive buildings.Among the strategies,reducing the incremental cost of developers has the best performance,followed by government subsidies,and the performance of punishing developers is not so good.

关 键 词：演化博弈 系统动力学 被动式建筑 仿真分析 

分 类 号：TU201.5[建筑科学—建筑设计及理论]