多任务委托代理下国家公园财政拨款激励机制  

Incentive Mechanism for National Parks’Financial Appropriation Analyzed Using Multitask Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：胡凯 邓毅[2] HU Kai;DENG Yi(School of Economics,South-Central Minzu University,Wuhan 430074,China;School of Tourism and Hospitality Management,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205,China)

机构地区：[1]中南民族大学经济学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]湖北经济学院旅游与酒店管理学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《旅游学刊》2023年第4期149-160,共12页Tourism Tribune

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“国家公园资金保障机制与对策研究”(16BGL117)资助。

摘　　要：国家公园承担着生态环境保护和资源合理利用两项相互冲突的使命,如何通过财政拨款机制来激励国家公园管理机构协调两项任务之间的冲突,是国家公园体制建设中面临的棘手问题。文章运用多任务委托代理理论,从财政事权划分的视角,即中央事权和中央地方共同事权两个方面,来分析国家公园财政拨款的激励机制问题。研究表明,中央事权体制下委托人向代理人拨款应遵循以下原则:一项任务产出的边际收益越高,给予的激励越大,对另一任务给予的激励越小;一项任务产出的不可观察度越高,给予的激励越小,对另一任务的激励也越小;一项任务的成本系数越高,给予的激励越小,但对另一任务给予的激励越大;成本函数偏离稳定点越远,给予的激励越小;风险规避和任务替代性对激励的影响具有门槛条件。共同事权体制下,两个委托人合作时,向代理人提供的激励与中央事权下形式相同,拨款机制也相同;两个委托人不合作时,地方政府向代理人提供的激励形式、拨款机制与中央事权下相同,而中央政府向代理人提供的激励为产出边际收益的一半。基于两任务的替代性,为激励代理人在生态保护上付诸更多努力,需要提高其产出边际收益,降低产出不可观察度,降低成本系数,使成本函数趋于稳定点。National parks assume two conflicting purposes:Environment protection and rational use of resources.When developing national parks,it is necessary to incentivize their management agencies to tackle the problematic issue of addressing the divergences between those two aims through financial allocation.This study applied multitask principal-agent theory to analyze the incentive mechanism for financial appropriations from the perspective of fiscal authority,i.e.,central authority or common authority of central and local governments.Research has shown that under the central authority system,the principal should observe the following codes in granting funds to the agent:The higher the marginal income of one task,the greater is the incentive given to that task and the smaller the incentive accorded to another one;The higher the degree of unobservability,the smaller is the incentive given to one task and the smaller the incentive for another one;The higher the cost coefficient of one task,the smaller is the incentive given to that task but the greater the incentive accorded to another one;The greater the cost function deviates from a stable point,the smaller is the incentive given;The influence of risk aversion and task substitution on incentives has threshold conditions.Under common authority,when two principals cooperate,the incentive provided to the agent is the same as that under central authority,and the funding mechanism is the same;When two principals do not cooperate,local government provides the agent with the same form of incentives as the central authority;The funding mechanism is also the same,and the incentive provided by central government to the agent is half the marginal return of output.From the substitutability of the two tasks,to encourage agents to make greater efforts for environment protection,it is necessary to increase the marginal revenue of that protection output,reduce unobservability,decrease the cost coefficient,and stabilize the cost function.

关 键 词：国家公园 财政拨款 财政事权 多任务委托代理 共同代理 

分 类 号：F59[经济管理—旅游管理]