大股东控制对企业金融化的影响研究  

Research on the Influence of Large Shareholder Control on Enterprise Financialization

作　　者：邵志浩 尚婷婷 才国伟[2] SHAO Zhihao;SHANG Tingting;CAI Guowei(Qingdao University,Qingdao,Shandong,China;Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学经济学院 [2]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2023年第5期780-788,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(22&ZD058);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72073147);国家统计局资助重点项目(2020LZ24)。

摘　　要：利用2007~2019年中国A股上市公司数据,考察大股东控制对企业金融化的影响。研究发现,大股东持股比例上升有助于抑制企业金融化,支持大股东的“监督效应”和金融化的“投资替代”动机;在管理层持股比例低、盈余管理严重、机构投资者持股比例低及分析师跟踪人数少的情况下,大股东控制对金融化的影响更强,表明大股东确实通过“监督效应”约束了企业金融化。进一步研究发现,大股东持股比例对企业金融化的负向影响,在非国有、经营风险高、融资约束大的企业以及金融市场收益高、金融投资风险大、经济政策不确定性高的环境中更加明显。Using the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2019,this study examines the impact of large shareholder control on the financialization of enterprises.The research finds that:The increase of the shareholding ratio of large shareholder helps to inhibit the financialization of enterprises,which supports the supervision effect of large shareholder and the investment substitution motivation of financialization;At the same time,under the circumstances of low shareholding ratio of management,serious earnings management,low shareholding ratio of institutional investors and few following analysts,the impact of large shareholder control on financialization is more significant,indicating that large shareholder does restrict the enterprise financialization through supervision effect.Further research shows that the negative impact of the shareholding ratio of large shareholder on enterprise financialization is more obvious in enterprises with non-state-owned property rights,high operation risk and large financing constraints,as well as in the environment of high financial market returns,high financial investment risks and high economic policy uncertainty.

关 键 词：大股东控制 金融化 监督效应 投资替代 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]