基于规模不经济和网络外部性的捆绑手机供应链定价决策  

Pricing Decision of the Bundled Mobile Phone Supply Chain Based on Diseconomies of Scale and Network Externalities

作　　者：王玉燕[1] 王德霞 孙煜林 刘宗超 杨振龙 韩强[1] WANG Yuyan;WANG Dexia;SUN Yulin;LIU Zongchao;YANG Zhenlong;HAN Qiang(School of Management Science and Engineering,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014;Sydney University Engineering and Computer Science Faculty,New South Wales Sydney,NSW 2006)

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院,济南250014 [2]悉尼大学工程与计算科学学院,悉尼2006

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2023年第3期577-594,共18页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71971129);山东省高等学校青创科技支持计划(2019RWG017);济南市自主培养创新团队项目(202228075);泰山学者工程专项青年专家项目(tsqn202211197)资助课题。

摘　　要：考虑网络外部性和规模不经济的影响,对捆绑手机供应链的决策展开研究.构建了捆绑手机供应链的分散决策模型和集中决策模型,并对模型进行了比较分析.研究表明:1)规模不经济系数会阻碍系统利润的增长,而网络外部性系数促进系统利润的增长.2)手机制造商或电信运营商主导系统时所获利润远高于其不主导系统时的情形.同时手机制造商主导系统时,系统的利润要高于电信运营商主导系统时的利润.3)在分散决策下,手机制造商和电信运营商的利润均未达到最优:集中决策下,合约机套餐价格较低,总的销量更高,系统的利润更高.通过“补贴联合收益共享”协调契约,可以实现手机制造商和电信运营商的收益最大化.To study the impact of network externalities and diseconomies of scale on the decision-making of the bundled mobile phone supply chain,this paper establishes the decentralized and centralized models respectively.This paper adopts reverse induction method to calculate the optimal decisions of the different models and compares the operational efficiency of them based on Stackelberg game theory.The comparative analysis and numerical simulation results show that the coefficient of diseconomies of scale hinders the growth of system profits,while the coefficient of network externalities promotes the growth of system profits.The profit of the mobile phone manufacturer or the telecom operator obtained when the mobile phone manufacturer or telecom operator dominates the system is much higher than when it does not dominate the system.At the same time,when the mobile phone manufacturers dominate the system,the system profit is higher than the system profit when telecom operators dominate the system.Additionally,the profits of mobile phone manufacturers and telecom operators of the decentralized model have not reached the optimal level.In the centralized model,the package price of the contract mobile phone is lower,the total sales is higher,and the system profit is higher.Through the "subsidy joint revenue sharin"contract,the profits of mobile phone manufacturers and telecom operators can be maximized.

关 键 词：规模不经济 网络外部性 捆绑定价 协调 

分 类 号：F416.63[经济管理—产业经济] F274