商业保险公司承办大病保险激励机制研究--基于委托代理理论  

Study on the Incentive Mechanism of Critical Illness Insurance Undertaken by Commercial Insurance Companies:Based on Principal-agent Theor

作　　者：王江娜 郑先平[1] 童潇 吴超男 刘雅[1] Wang Jiangna;Zhang Xianping;Tong Xiao;Wu Chaonan;Liu Ya

机构地区：[1]江西中医药大学经济与管理学院,江西南昌330004

出　　处：《保险职业学院学报》2023年第2期23-29,共7页Journal of Insurance Professional College

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(18BGL199);江西中医药大学经济与管理学院2021年度研究生科研训练计划项目(2021jzzdxkx039)。

摘　　要：本文基于委托代理理论视角,研究如何完善商业保险公司承办城乡居民大病保险的激励机制问题。通过构建政府与商业保险公司之间委托代理模型,利用模型推导,解析出政府最佳激励机制设定条件。结果表明:最优激励系数与努力成本系数、绝对风险规避系数、随机外生变量呈现负相关关系,与公司能力水平系数、社会效益转换系数以及公司潜在收益系数呈现正相关关系。据此,建议政府在设计激励机制时从风险分担机制、外部因素、降低信息不对称等方面考虑,给保险公司设定适当的激励强度,提高大病保险运行效率和服务质量,维护参保人健康保障权益的期望目标。Based on the Principal-agent Theory,this paper studies the improvement of the incentive mechanism for commercial insurance companies to undertake critical illness insurance for urban and rural residents.By constructing the principal-agent model between the government and commercial insurance companies,and using the model derivation,it analyzes the conditions for setting the optimal incentive mechanism of the government.The results show that the optimal incentive coefficient is negatively correlated with the effort cost coefficient,the absolute risk aversion coefficient and the random exogenous variables,and positively correlated with the company's ability level coefficient,the social benefit conversion coefficient and the company's potential revenue coefficient.Therefore,when designing the incentive mechanism,the government should consider the risk sharing mechanism,external factors,reducing information asymmetry and other aspects,and focus on setting appropriate incentive intensity for insurance companies,so as to improve the operation efficiency and service quality of critical illness insurance and safeguard the health security rights and interests of the insured.

关 键 词：大病保险 委托代理理论 商业保险公司 激励机制 

分 类 号：F840.613[经济管理—保险]