飞地经济中的“猎鹿困境”及其消解——基于博弈分析的视角  

Dilemma and Resolution of the Stag Hunt Game in Enclave Economy:Based on the Perspective of Game Theory Model

作　　者：张日波[1] 钱姝凡 ZHANG Ribo;QIAN Shufan(Department of Economics,Party School of Zhejiang Provincial Commttee of the Communist Party of China,Hangzhou,Zhejiang,311121,China)

机构地区：[1]中共浙江省委党校经济学教研部,浙江杭州311121

出　　处：《浙江树人大学学报》2023年第2期30-39,共10页Journal of Zhejiang Shuren University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(20BJL067);浙江省重点智库全面从严治党研究中心成果。

摘　　要：飞地经济作为协调区域发展的重要手段之一,能打破地方政府之间的行政壁垒、畅通要素在更大范围内流动,实现发达地区与欠发达地区的互利共赢。然而,实践中时有发生地方政府罔顾“互利共赢”的最优策略,产生“消极应对”甚至“单打独斗”的现象。这表明,飞地经济的合作陷入了“猎鹿困境”。为了更好地认识且消解这一发展困境,以修正后的猎鹿博弈分析框架为基础,对地方政府主体之间可能发生的博弈行为及其博弈均衡条件进行探讨。在此基础上,以衢州海创园为案例,进行博弈策略设计,以期帮助地方政府走出“猎鹿困境”,亦为促进飞地经济的可持续发展提供有益借鉴。As one of the important approaches to coordinate regional development,enclave economy can break the administrative barriers between local governments,facilitate the flow of elements in a wider range,and achieve mutual benefit and win-win outcomes between developed and underdeveloped regions.However,in practice local governments sometimes turn to“negative response”and“fight alone”in disregard of the best strategy for“mutual benefit and win-win cooperation”.This shows that the cooperation of enclave economy has fallen into the“stag hunt dilemma”.In order to better understand and resolve this development dilemma,this paper discusses the possible game behaviors of local governments and their game equilibrium conditions on the basis of the revised analytical framework of stag hunt and game theory.Taking Quzhou Haichuang Park as a case study,the game strategy is designed to help the local government step out of the“stag hunt dilemma”.The strategy can also provide beneficial reference for promoting the sustainable development of the enclave economy.

关 键 词：飞地经济 地方政府 猎鹿困境 博弈 区域经济 

分 类 号：F124[经济管理—世界经济] F224.32