财务管理、信息甄别与小微企业融资——基于博弈模型分析与准自然实验证据  

Financial Management,Information Screening and Small and Micro Enterprises Financing——Based on Game Model Analysis and Quasi-natural Experimental Evidence

作　　者：王兆旭[1] 韩庆潇 乔永军 Wang Zhaoxu;Han Qingxiao;Qiao Yongjun(PBC Jinan Branch,Jinan 250021,Shandong,China;Shandong Shanda Capital Operations Co.,Ltd,Jinan 250021,Shandong,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行济南分行,山东济南250021 [2]山东山大资本运营有限公司,山东济南250100

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2023年第4期29-38,共10页Journal Of Financial Development Research

摘　　要：本文利用动态博弈模型探讨了财务管理改革解决小微企业融资困境的内在机理,并运用多期双重差分模型检验了改革的作用效果。研究结果表明,财务管理改革有助于解决银企之间的信息不对称问题,将混合均衡转化为分离均衡,从而有效缓解优质小微企业融资难、融资贵。从作用方向来看,财务管理改革更有利于解决无法提供抵质押物的优质小微企业融资难的问题,以及能够提供抵质押物的优质小微企业融资贵的问题。从作用时滞来看,在改革一年后作用最强,融资难和融资贵的问题得到明显缓解。This paper explores the intrinsic mechanism of financial management reform to solve the financing dilemma of micro and small enterprises using a dynamic game model,and tests the effect of the reform using a multi-period double difference model.The research results show that the financial management reform helps to solve the information asymmetry problem between banks and enterprises and transform the mixed equilibrium into the separated equilibrium,thus effectively alleviating the difficulty and cost of financing for high-quality micro and small enterprises.In terms of the direction of action,the financial management reform is more conducive to solving the problem of difficult financing for high-quality MSMEs that cannot provide collateral,and the problem of expensive financing for high-quality MSMEs that can provide collateral.In terms of the time lag of the effect,the effect is strongest one year after the reform,and the problem of difficult and expensive financing is significantly alleviated.

关 键 词：信息不对称 财务管理改革 融资难 融资贵 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]