非常规突发事件下应急物资储备政企协同演化博弈  

Government-enterprise cooperative evolutionary game of emergency material reserve under unconventional emergency events

作　　者：邵舒羽 刘艳[1,2] 王晴 张诗可 刘若阳 SHAO Shuyu;LIU Yan;WANG Qing;ZHANG Shike;LIU Ruoyang(School of Logistics,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China;Beijing Logistics System and Technology Key Laboratory,Beijing 101149,China)

机构地区：[1]北京物资学院物流学院,北京101149 [2]北京市物流系统与技术重点实验室,北京101149

出　　处：《中国安全科学学报》2023年第4期210-220,共11页China Safety Science Journal

基　　金：北京市社会科学基金资助(21GCL040)。

摘　　要：为有效降低应急物资政企协同管理下的物资损失,基于协同管理机制的特性,首先,分析协同管理成本、政府补贴力度、企业前景损益、政府惩罚力度等因素对政企双方演化博弈决策的影响;然后,构建非常规突发事件下应急物资储备政企协同演化博弈模型;最后,通过仿真试验验证常规环境和非常规突发事件下政府和企业的不同行为对应急物资储备的影响,探究企业行为策略和演化稳定性,并分析影响政企双方行为决策变化的因素。结果表明:适当的经济激励既可以提高应急物资储备的效率,又有利于促进企业主动承担社会责任,激发企业主导应急机制的落实推进;降低企业参与应急物资储备协同成本,提高企业主导落实应急物资储备带来的长期经济收益与社会收益,有利于提高对非常规突发事件的应对能力;两方博弈主体的成本收益满足一定条件时,系统将演化至稳定状态。In order to effectively reduce the loss of emergency materials under the coordinated management of government-enterprise,and based on the characteristics of collaborative management mechanism,firstly,the influence of factors on government-enterprise evolution game decision-making was considered,from aspects of collaborative management cost,government subsidy,enterprise prospect profit and loss,government punishment and other factors.Then,the co-evolution game model of the government-enterprise emergency material reserve under unconventional emergencies was constructed.The influence of different behavior of government and enterprise on emergency material reserves under conventional environments and unconventional emergencies was verified by simulation,and the enterprise behavior strategy and evolution stability were explored.And the factors that affect the behavior decision-making of both government and enterprise are analyzed.The effectiveness of the model was verified by simulation.The results indicate that appropriate economic incentives can not only improve the efficiency of emergency materials reserve,but also encourage enterprises to take the initiative to assume social responsibility,stimulate enterprises to take the lead in the implementation of the emergency mechanism,and reduce the coordination cost of enterprises participating in emergency materials reserves.Improving the long-term economic and social benefits brought by enterprises'implementing emergency materials reserves is conducive to improving the ability to deal with unconventional emergencies.When the costs and benefits of the two players meet certain conditions,the system will evolve to a stable state.

关 键 词：非常规突发事件 应急物资储备 政企协同 演化博弈 协同管理 

分 类 号：X928.03[环境科学与工程—安全科学]