减损规则对违约方解除权的功能替代——以真假“合同僵局”为中心  

Functional Replacement of the Defaulting Party's Right of Rescission by the Mitigation Rule:Centering on the Real and Fake“Contractual Deadlocks”

作　　者：严立 YAN Li(Law School,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学法学院,北京100871

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第3期106-115,共10页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

摘　　要：违约方解除权仅能解决非金钱债务陷于履行不能导致的真正合同僵局案件,其规范价值在于明确了无论履行不能是否可归责于当事人,对待给付义务均非直接消灭,一律需要行使解除权。非金钱债务的债权人拒绝受领给付,并欲逃避作为对待给付的金钱债务并不构成真正的合同僵局。然而学说与案例均混淆了此二种迥然不同的案型,将违约方解除权规则错误地扩张至后一种情形,这才是违约方解除权引发质疑和反对的真正原因。债权人拒绝受领的假想合同僵局中,债权人要从合同关系中脱出,应当求助于减损规则,令非违约方及时终止合同,或者直接由法院行使司法形成权终止之。在这个意义上减损规则成为了违约方解除权的功能替代。The defaulting party's right of rescission can solve real contractual deadlocks where nonpecuniary obligations fall into impossibility.Its normative value is to clarify that no matter whether the impossibility is attributed to the parties or not,the obligee who shall receive the nonpecuniary performance cannot release automatically from his own debt,but has to resort to the right to rescind instead.That the obligee who shall receive the nonpecuniary performance refuses to do so and hopes to rescind his own debt is the so-called fake contractual deadlock,which has unfortunately been confused with its real counterpart by theory and practice as well.Expanding the rules for real contractual deadlocks to the fake ones has invited a lot of doubt and opposition.Where a fake deadlock happens,the obligee who wants to escape from the binding force of the contract may urge the obligor to rescind the contract initially according to the mitigation rule.To this extent,the mitigation rule can be regarded as the functional replacement of the defaulting party's right of rescission.

关 键 词：合同僵局 履行不能 违约方解除权 合同的清理结算 减损规则 

分 类 号：D923.6[政治法律—民商法学]