监管机制与职业声誉对银行经营者的激励影响研究--从“外部约束”到“内在激励”  

Research on the Incentive Effects of Regulatory Mechanisms and Professional Reputation on Bank Operators:From"External Constraints"to"Internal Incentives"

作　　者：战勇 ZHAN Yong(Business School,Central South University,Changsha,Hunan 410083,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2023年第3期27-34,共8页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学重大项目(21&2D115)。

摘　　要：高质量的内部控制是降低银行经营风险的重要保障。监管等外部约束常会出现失灵,而纯粹职业生涯考虑虽能激发银行经营者内在激励效应,但无法解决经营者职业生涯末期的徇私问题。因此,“外部约束”与“内在激励”相结合成为内部治理机制建设的需要。两期动态博弈模型显示,监管的引入削弱了隐性职业声誉激励,产生一定“挤出效应”;监管的引入虽然没有完全解决徇私问题,但使银行经营者在其职业生涯末期的忠诚度增强,改善了纯粹依靠职业声誉所产生的激励。监管有效也需要一定条件:一是好的职场环境,二是公平的声誉评价机制,三是合适的监管强度。可见,提升银行内部控制水平是个系统工程,除了要完善机制外,还要加强银行文化和共同价值观建设。High quality internal control is an important guarantee for reducing bank risks,but external constraints such as regulation often fail.Although pure career considerations can stimulate the internal incentive effect of bank operators,they cannot solve the problem of favoritism at the end of their career.The combination of "external constraints"and "internal incentives" has become a need for the construction of internal governance mechanisms.The two-stage dynamic game model shows that the introduction of regulation weakens implicit professional reputation incentives,resulting in a certain"crowding out effect";Although the introduction of regulation did not fully address the issue of favoritism,it increased the loyalty of bank operators at the end of their career and improved the incentives generated solely by professional reputation.Effective regulation also requires certain conditions:firstly,a good workplace environment,secondly,a fair reputation evaluation mechanism,and thirdly,appropriate regulatory intensity.Improving the internal control level of banks is a systematic project.In addition to improving mechanisms,it is also necessary to strengthen the construction of bank culture and common values.

关 键 词：银行内部控制 内在激励 监管机制 职业声誉 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]