法律完备度、激励合约与股价操纵  

Completeness of Law and Stock Price Manipulation:A Perspective from Equity Incentive Contract

作　　者：姜华东 乔晓楠[2] JIANG Huadong;QIAO Xiaonan(School of Finance,Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai 201209,China;School of Economics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计金融学院金融学院,上海201209 [2]南开大学经济学院,天津300071

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2023年第3期617-633,共17页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(17BGL056);教育部人文社会科学青年项目(16YJC790038)。

摘　　要：通过构建一个附带法律机制的激励合约模型来讨论法律完备度、股权激励与股价操纵之间的关系。研究发现,新《证券法》的推行提高了法律完备度,抑制了一部分股价操纵。但是,从激励合约来看,股权激励弹性、经理人声誉偏好、市场波动性等特征可能会带来股价操纵的反向增加,新兴市场的股价操纵短期内可能会不降反升。而且,法律完备度的增加是缓慢的,依赖于法律执行力,而股权激励弹性、市场波动性等因素的影响却立竿见影。对激励弹性高的公司进行重点监管、建立经理人声誉指数将有助于提升股价操纵监管的效率。This paper develops a rational expectations model of executive compensation to analyze stock price manipulation.Combining the market characteristics,it also discusses the manipulation in the sci-tech innovation board of China’s securities market.The evidences show that promoting the completeness of law can help curb manipulation.Meanwhile,some characteristics may result in an increase of manipulation.The incentive elasticity,managers’reputation preference,and market volatility may lead to an increase in the quantity and revenue of stock price manipulation.

关 键 词：法律完备度 新《证券法》 股价操纵 激励弹性 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]