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作 者:张蓓佳[1] ZHANG Beijia(School of Management,Anhui University,Hefei Anhui 230601,China)
出 处:《盐城工学院学报(社会科学版)》2023年第2期21-28,共8页Journal of Yancheng Institute of Technology(Social Science Edition)
基 金:安徽高校人文社会科学研究项目(SK2021A0062)。
摘 要:为了解决居民垃圾分类参与率较低的问题,构建地方政府、物业公司和居民三方演化博弈模型,分析演化的稳定策略及实现条件,并进行模型仿真。研究表明:监管、规范、分类投放是最符合实际的稳定策略,它受到三方的行为收益、行为成本以及奖惩机制的影响;初始状态的改变不会影响稳定收敛结果,但物业公司和居民的决策收敛过程会出现震荡现象;调节地方政府奖惩参数,能使物业公司和居民的演化路径向收敛结果转变,并增加收敛速度。In order to solve the problem of low participation rate of residents′garbage classification,based on evolutionary game theory,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model with the participation of local governments,property companies and residents,analyzes the stability strategy and implementation conditions of evolution,and uses MATLAB software to simulate the evolutionary behavior of each game player under different parameter values.The research shows that supervision,regulation,classified release strategy is the most practical and stable strategy for the three parties,and its realization is affected by the behavior income,the cost of the three parties′behavior and the reward and punishment mechanism.The change of the initial state of the three parties will not affect the stable convergence result,but the decision convergence process of the property company and residents will be subject to shocks;adjusting the parameters of the local government reward and punishment mechanism can change the evolution path of the property company and residents to the convergence result at the same time,and increase the convergence speed.
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