闭环供应链中再制品价格欺骗的均衡路径分析  

Equilibrium Path Analysis of Price Cheating on RemanufacturedProducts in Closed-loop Supply Chain

作　　者：杨明歌[1] 盛鑫 梁小珍[1] YANG Mingge;SHENG Xin;LIANG Xiaozhen(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200444

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第4期61-70,共10页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(11801352,71701122)。

摘　　要：由于市场监管缺乏和企业诚信缺失,再制品市场的价格欺骗事件层出不穷,严重损害了消费者的利益和市场配置的有效性。本文研究闭环供应链中的再制品价格欺骗问题。首先,构建一个由销售商和消费者组成的双方演化博弈模型,通过Jacobi矩阵分析混合策略的演化稳定性。结果表明:当再制品伪装之后的销售价格与伪装成本的差小于再制品不伪装的销售价格时,销售商选择不伪装,消费者选择购买,再制品市场是有效的。其次,考虑政府对销售商奖励或惩罚的措施,构建一个由销售商、消费者和政府组成的三方演化博弈模型,通过Jacobi矩阵分析混合策略的演化稳定性。结果表明:政府积极检查再制品市场,加大奖励和惩罚力度,均能促使销售商选择不伪装且消费者选择购买,市场达到有效配置。最后,通过数值分析验证相关结论的正确性。In recent years,the rapid development of remanufacturing industry has promoted the transformation of traditional supply chain to closed-loop supply chain.Due to the lack of market supervision and the lack of corporate integrity,price cheating in the remanufactured product market emerges one after another.In order to obtain more profit,the sellers of remanufactured products usually spend some camouflage cost.They camouflage remanufactured products as new products and sell camouflaged remanufactured products at the price of new products in the market.This behavior of the sellers is the price cheating on remanufactured products.It not only severely damages the benefits of the consumers,but also hinders the healthy development of the remanufactured product market.In order to protect the benefits of the consumers and promote the healthy development of the remanufactured product market,we study the price cheating on remanufactured products in the back-to-sale link of closed-loop supply chain and discuss its internal mechanism and solution in this paper.We first consider the camouflage cost in the narrow sense,and then consider the camouflage cost in the broad sense.Also,the results under two cases are compared.Firstly,considering the camouflage cost in the narrow sense,we construct an evolutionary game model composed of the seller and the consumer,and analyze the evolutionary stability of mixed strategies through Jacobi matrix.The results show that when the difference between the camouflaged selling price and the camouflage cost of the remanufactured products is smaller than the non-camouflaged selling price of the remanufactured products,the seller chooses not to camouflage and the consumer chooses to buy.At this time,the remanufactured product market is effective.So in the evolutionary game between the seller and the consumer,increasing the camouflage cost can prompt the system evolve to an effective state that the seller chooses not to camouflage and the consumer chooses to buy.In fact,the increase of camouflage cos

关 键 词：再制品 价格欺骗 演化博弈 复制动态方程 JACOBI矩阵 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]