互联网金融创新与监管并行策略研究  

Parallel Strategy between Innovation and Supervision on Internet Finance

作　　者：吕秀梅[1] LYU Xiumei(School of Finance,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学金融学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第4期198-204,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(19XYJ022);重庆工商大学2021-2022重点科研平台开放课题(KFJJ2022044)。

摘　　要：运用演化动态博弈方法分析互联网金融创新与监管间的动态博弈,推演出并行策略演化路径,并通过仿真模拟进行实证检验。研究表明,互金企业创新意愿与创新收益、监管成本正相关,与创新成本和可能罚金呈正态分布关系;监管部门监管意愿与罚金、监管额外收益正相关,与创新收益负相关,与监管成本呈正态分布关系;创新成本对监管部门的监管策略没有影响,但与监管部门非监管策略的概率负相关。因此,互金企业应以合规为前提,通过技术、模式及产品的创新提高创新收益,通过多样化营销渠道降低创新成本;监管部门可通过监管科技来降低监管成本,且在互金企业创新意愿不强时采取多种措施来刺激或鼓励创新。该研究有助于厘清互联网金融中互金企业创新与监管机构之间的激励约束,为促进互联网金融健康发展提供更多理论支撑和政策启示。Innovation is a major feature of Internet finance.It can not only reduce information asymmetry,improve financial efficiency,but also better guide financial resources to develop inclusive finance and serve the real economy.However,Internet finance corporations may innovate in order to get rid of financial regulatory constraints.If regulatory authorities can supervise timely and effectively,regulatory arbitrage and illegal acts will be avoided.There exists a dynamic closed-loop game“supervision and innovation”between regulatory authorities and Internet finance corporations.Whether the supervision is excessive or insufficient,it is bound to inhibit Internet financial innovation.Only moderate supervision can provide a favorable environment for financial innovation.However,the existing literature rarely deals with the dynamic game between Internet financial innovation and supervision,and rarely analyzes the game balance between these two important participants.Therefore,the paper analyzes the impact of various factors on the strategic game with innovation and regulation and deduces the possible parallel strategic path.The paper can enrich the relevant research on the innovation and supervision of Internet finance,help clarify the incentives and constraints between the innovation of corporations and regulators,and provide more theoretical support and policy inspiration for promoting the healthy development of Internet finance.Using the evolutionary dynamic game method,the paper establishes a dynamic game model between the innovation and supervision of Internet finance and derives the evolutionary path of parallel strategy.Firstly,we consider the different conditions of whether Internet finance corporations and regulatory authorities participate in the game or not,and then obtain the income matrix of the game between them.Secondly,the replication dynamic equations for Internet finance corporations and regulatory authorities are deduced,respectively,by which the parallel strategy is discussed for these two parties un

关 键 词：互联网金融 创新 监管 并行策略 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]