制度性权力竞争:以立法统一审议制度为例  

Institutional Power Competition in Uniform Deliberation System

作　　者：王理万 Wang Liwan(Human Rights Institute,China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 100088)

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学人权研究院,北京100088

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2023年第6期38-46,157,共10页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：“中国政法大学钱端升杰出学者支持计划资助项目”;教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“中国共产党领导法治工作历史进程与经验研究”(21JZD009)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：制度性权力竞争是指以制度为基础、以权力为内容、以竞争为形式的横向分权关系,即不同部门之间甚至同一部门内部关于同质或同类权力的竞争,并为政治决策者最终确定权力归属提供依据。围绕立法统一审议制度,形成了立法机关外部和内部的权力竞争:在外部层面,立法机关通过统一审议制度,强化了立法主导权,实现对“部门立法”的审查和控制;在内部层面,全国人大法律委员会和其他专门委员会对立法审议权展开竞争和调适。内外权力竞争之间,存在深度的连接和互动。外部的制度性权力竞争压力,逐步传导进入立法机关内部,“法律委+法工委”的立法组合由此应运而生且不断加强。“制度性权力竞争”理论具有广泛的适用性和解释力,为理解中国政制发展提供了新思路。Institutional power competition refers to the horizontal decentralization and competition between different departments or even within the same department regarding homogeneous or similar power.The uniform deliberation system has formed a competition outside and inside the legislature.At the external level,the legislature has strengthened its legislative dominance through the uniform deliberation system to achieve the control of“departmental legislation”.At the internal level,the Legal Committee of the NPC and other special committees compete and adjust the legislative review power.There is a deep connection and interaction between the internal and external double-layer power competition.The pressure of external institutional power competition is gradually transmitted into the legislature,which promotes the internal management of the legislature to deal with external pressures.Therefore,the legislative combination of the“Legal Committee&Commission of Legislative Affairs”is bound to emerge and strengthen.The theory of“institutional power competition”has broad applicability and explanatory power,and provides new ideas for understanding China’s political development.

关 键 词：制度性权力竞争 横向权力配置 法律委员会 统一审议制度 

分 类 号：D920.0[政治法律—法学]