WTO争端解决机制改革的经济学分析  被引量:2

An Economic Analysis of the Reform of WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism

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作  者:李计广[1] 郑育礼 田丰[3] Li Ji-guang;Zheng Yu-li;Tian Feng

机构地区:[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济研究院,北京100029 [2]中国社会科学院台湾研究所,北京100083 [3]中国社科院中国社会科学评价研究院,北京100005

出  处:《亚太经济》2023年第2期46-56,共11页Asia-Pacific Economic Review

基  金:国家社科基金重大项目“中国参与多边贸易体制改革的方案设计与谈判策略研究”(19ZDA064)。

摘  要:争端解决机制改革是WTO改革的重要内容,各成员已经提交了多个改革方案。基于1989—2020年的GATT/WTO争端解决数据和贸易数据,采用PSM-DID分析方法研究发现,争端解决程序(机制)整体上具有贸易促进效应,证明GATT/WTO争端解决具有正的外部性,揭示了WTO争端解决机制改革取得成功的经济学基础。然而,WTO争端解决机制的经济效益虽较GATT有很大提升,但是仍存在南北落差,对中美欧等重要成员的贸易效应也不尽一致,成为各方改革主张大相径庭的经济动因。中国是WTO争端解决机制的获益方,较好地执行了争端裁决,应积极推动WTO争端解决机制尽快恢复正常功能,避免倒退回GATT时代。A key component of the WTO reform is the reform of the dispute settlement mechanism,and various members have offered a number of reform proposals.Using the PSM-DID analysis method on trade and GATT/WTO dispute settlement data from 1989 to 2020,it is discovered that the dispute settlement mechanism as a whole has a trade promotion effect,demonstrating that the GATT/WTO dispute settlement has positive externalities and providing the economic justification for the success of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism reform.Despite the fact that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has significantly outperformed the GATT in terms of economic benefits,there is still a divide between the North and the South,and trade effects on significant members like China,the United States,and Europe are inconsistent.As a result,various members'proposed reforms have been driven by a very different economic motivation.The WTO dispute settlement mechanism,which has done a decent job of resolving disputes,helps China.To avoid reverting to GATT,China should vigorously encourage the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to resume regular operation as soon as possible.

关 键 词:WTO 争端解决机制 贸易效应 双重差分 

分 类 号:F742[经济管理—国际贸易] D815[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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