公司治理结构对过度投资行为的影响研究  

Research on the Influence of Corporate Governance Structure on Over-Investment Behavior

作　　者：李春 LI Chun(Antai College of Economics&Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2023年第3期111-116,共6页Shanghai Management Science

摘　　要：为探究公司治理结构对过度投资行为的影响,以股东、董事会、管理层作为公司治理的结构框架,使用我国上市公司2009—2018年的数据进行实证研究。结果发现:第一大股东持股对过度投资的影响呈现倒U型;机构持股比例增加反而促使过度投资。不同于通常对二级市场流通股追涨杀跌的投机行为的看法,发现自由流通股对抑制公司过度投资发挥着显著的作用,这一治理作用主要体现在高风险的公司之中。进一步研究发现:公司非系统风险的改善是自由流通股抑制公司过度投资水平的重要作用路径。这同时也说明了自由流通股能通过市场的治理机制来缓解代理问题引起的过度投资问题。此外,独立董事和管理层治理却对抑制公司过度投资的作用有限。In order to explore the impact of corporate governance structure on over-investment,taking shareholders,board of directors and management as the structural framework of corporate governance,and using the data of China's listed companies from 2009 to 2018 for empirical research.The research finds that the influence of the first largest shareholder's shareholding on over-investment presents an inverted U shape;On the contrary,the increase in the proportion of institutional ownership will promote over-investment.Different from the usual view on the speculative behavior of tradable shares,result shows that tradable shares play a significant role in restraining the over-investment of companies,and this governance role is mainly reflected in high-risk companies.Further research found that the improvement of non-system risk of the company is an important path for the tradable shares to inhibit the level of over-investment.This also shows that tradable shares can alleviate the problem of over-investment caused by agency problems through the market governance mechanism.In addition,the governance of independent directors and management has limited effect on restraining the over-investment of companies.

关 键 词：代理问题 公司治理 过度投资 自由流通股 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]