绿色补贴背景下逆向供应链主体合谋行为研究  

Research on Collusive Risk Prevention Strategy of Reverse Supply Chain Under the Background of Green Subsidies

作　　者：唐一恒 郑湘明[1] 张萌 TANG Yiheng;ZHENG Xiangming;ZHANG Meng(College of Business,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou Hunan 412007,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学商学院,湖南株洲412007

出　　处：《湖南工业大学学报》2023年第4期80-87,共8页Journal of Hunan University of Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(21BGL025);湖南工业大学研究生科研创新基金资助项目(CX2125)。

摘　　要：为探究绿色补贴背景下逆向供应链中的合谋诈骗行为,在有限理性假设下,构建了基于前景理论的政府、制造商和回收商的三方博弈模型,研究逆向供应链中制造商和回收商合谋骗取政府绿色补贴的行为原理,分析了影响政府、制造商和回收商决策的关键因素。运用Matlab进行算例分析,探究均衡概率和各个参数之间的关系。结果表明:政府的核查能力、惩罚力度、核查成本等因素能够对逆向供应链中的合谋行为产生关键影响;对于制造商和回收商而言,再制造成本和分赃比例是决定其是否合谋的主要因素。最后,站在政府角度,从核查能力、风险警示和完善奖惩制度3个方面提出了合谋防范建议。In view of an exploration of the collusive fraud in the reverse supply chain under the background of green subsidies,under the assumption of bounded rationality,a tripartite game model has thus been constructed of the government,manufacturers and recyclers based on prospect theory,followed by a study on the behavior principle of manufacturers and recyclers conspiring to defraud the government’s green subsidies in the reverse supply chain,as well as an analysis of the key factors affecting the decision-making of the government,manufacturers and recyclers.Matlab is used for an example analysis to explore the relationship between equilibrium probability and various parameters.The results show that such factors as the governmental verification ability,penalty force,and verification cost exert a key impact on the collusive behavior in the reverse supply chain.For manufacturers and recyclers,remanufacturing costs and the spoils share are the main factors determining whether or not to take collusive risks.Finally,from the perspective of the government,suggestions are put forward for a collusive prevention from three aspects:verification ability,risk warning and penalty system improvement.

关 键 词：绿色补贴 逆向供应链 前景理论 三方博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]