政府引导基金、创业投资与企业创新——基于演化博弈视角  

Government Guidance Fund,Venture Capital,and Enterprise Innovation:Base on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

作　　者：周育红[1] 王鹏宇[1] 梁小敏 Zhou Yuhong;Wang Pengyu;Liang Xiaomin

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学经济与金融学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2023年第6期41-53,共13页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“共享经济下创业投资新业态及其对区域创新的影响研究”(20BJY009)。

摘　　要：本文通过构建初创企业、创投机构和政府的三方演化博弈模型,运用Matlab数值仿真模拟,研究政府引导基金如何通过设定不同运作模式利用市场化运作达到政策性目标。结果发现,政府引导基金可以通过实施不同程度的让利激励或监管惩罚,影响创投机构投资策略和初创企业创新策略选择,使初创企业、创投机构和政府三方达到理想的演化均衡。在当前政府引导基金实施的让利机制中增加监管惩罚能更有效解决政府引导基金特殊的双重委托代理问题,使引导资金真正流向初创企业、促进创新。本文建议,政府引导基金应该有选择地进入创投领域;通过加强知识产权保护以提高创新预期收益、利用区块链技术建立政府引导基金私链以降低监管成本、提高惩罚力度以威慑创投机构违约等都可以打破劣后均衡转向理想均衡。By building a three-way evolutionary game model of start-ups,venture capital institutions and the government,and using Matlab numerical simulation,this paper studies how the government guidance fund achieves its policy objectives through market-based operation by setting different operation modes.The results show that the government guidance fund can influence the investment strategy selection of venture capital institutions and the innovation strategy selection of start-ups by implementing different degrees of profit-giving incentive or regulatory punishment,so that the three parties of start-ups,venture capital institutions and the government can achieve ideal evolutionary equilibrium.The special double principal-agent problem of the government guidance fund can be solved more effectively by adding regulatory punishment to the current profit-giving mechanism implemented by the government guidance fund,enabling guidance capital to truly flow to start-ups and promote innovation.This paper suggests that the government guidance fund should enter the venture capital field selectively,improve the expected earnings of innovation by strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights,use blockchain technology to establish a private chain of government guiding funds to reduce the cost of supervision,and raise the intensity of punishment to deter venture capital institutions from defaulting.The above suggestions can break the inferior equilibrium and shift towards an ideal equilibrium.

关 键 词：政府引导基金 创业投资 企业创新 演化博弈 双重委托代理问题 

分 类 号：F830.592[经济管理—金融学] F124F224.32