基于成本共担契约的双供应商政企联合应急储备博弈模型  

Game model of dual-supplier government-enterprise joint emergency reserve based on cost-sharing contract

作　　者：王喆[1,2] 梁梦宇 丛子皓 刘丹[1,2] WANG Zhe;LIANG Mengyu;CONG Zihao;LIU Dan(China Research Center for Emergency Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan Hubei 430070,China;School of Safety Science and Emergency Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan Hubei 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学中国应急管理研究中心,湖北武汉430070 [2]武汉理工大学安全科学与应急管理学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《中国安全生产科学技术》2023年第5期29-36,共8页Journal of Safety Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(20YJC630154);国家自然科学基金项目(71501151);湖北省自然科学基金项目(2016CFB467)。

摘　　要：为提高重大自然灾害应急物资保障能力,采用成本共担契约构建双供应商政企联合应急物资储备模型。通过分析政府和2个供应商之间的应急物资联合储备博弈过程,供应商决策以其利润最大化为目标,政府决策以成本控制为目标,构建政府处主导地位、供应商处从属地位的stackelberg博弈模型,推导政府与供应商的最优决策策略以及政府与供应商多方共赢与供应链协调的条件,并进行算例验算。研究结果表明:基于成本共担契约的双供应商应急储备模型能够有效提高政府应对自然灾害的应急物资保障能力,实现供应链协调,改善政府成本和供应商利润。To improve the emergency material support capacity in response to major natural disasters,a dual-supplier government-enterprise joint emergency material reserve model was constructed by using the cost-sharing contract.Through analyzing the game process of government and two suppliers in organizing the joint reserve of emergency material,the suppliers decision-making aimed at maximizing its profit,and the government decision-making aimed at cost control.A stackelberg game model with government at dominant position and suppliers at subordinate position was constructed,then the optimal decision-making strategy of the government and suppliers and the conditions of multi-win-win and supply chain coordination between government and suppliers were deduced,and the calculation example was given for verification.The results showed that the dual-supplier emergency reserve model based on cost-sharing contract could effectively improve the government’s emergency material support capacity in response to natural disasters,achieve the supply chain coordination,improve the government costs and suppliers profits.

关 键 词：应急物资储备 成本共担契约 STACKELBERG博弈 应急生产成本补贴 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] X915.5[环境科学与工程—安全科学]