平台MFN条款的垄断效应与规制分析  

Analysis on Monopoly Effect and Regulation of MFN Clause on Platform

作　　者：杨雪婧 Yang Xuejing

机构地区：[1]河南工业大学法学院

出　　处：《电子知识产权》2023年第4期30-40,共11页Electronics Intellectual Property

基　　金：郑州市R&D专项经费补助科研项目“推动郑州市数字产业发展制度保障研究”(项目编号:22ZZRDZX44)。

摘　　要：平台MFN条款在交叉网络效应的影响下,加剧了买方客户对平台的黏性,也深化了平台对卖方客户的锁定效应,进而对其他平台的竞争产生排他性影响;与此同时,平台MFN条款本身易引发共谋效应。反垄断法对平台MFN规制的主要问题集中在对平台MFN条款的定性、适用原则和规则上。由于不同运作模式下的平台MFN条款的垄断表现不同,建议根据平台MFN条款运作的具体情形进行分类,从平台MFN条款对市场竞争造成的实际效果来考虑MFN条款的定性及法律适用问题。Under the influence of cross-network effects,the MFN clause of the platform intensifies the stickiness of the buyer's customers to the platform,and also deepens the locking effect of the platform on the seller's customers,thus having an exclusive impact on the competition of other platforms.At the same time,the platform MFN clause itself is easy to cause collusion effect.The main problems of anti-monopoly law on MFN regulation of platform focus on the qualitative,applicable principles and rules of MFN clause of platform.Due to the different monopoly performance of MFN clause under different operation modes,it is suggested to classify the MFN clause according to the specific operation situation of the platform,and consider the qualitative and legal application of the MFN clause from the actual effect of the platform MFN clause on market competition.

关 键 词：平台MFN条款 双边网络效应 轴辐式协议 反垄断规制 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学] D996.1[政治法律—法学]