基于动态定价的虚拟电厂博弈能源管理模型  

Game Energy Management Model of Virtual Power Plant Based on Dynamic Pricing

作　　者：王辉[1] 金子蓉 方航 王一凡 李旭阳 王宝全 WANG Hui;JIN Zirong;FANG Hang;WANG Yifan;LI Xuyang;WANG Baoquan(Hubei Provincial Engineering Technology Research Center for Microgrid,China Three Gorges University,Yichang,Hubei 443002,China;College of Electrical Engineering&New Energy,China Three Gorges University,Yichang,Hubei 443002,China)

机构地区：[1]湖北省微电网工程技术研究中心,三峡大学,湖北宜昌443002 [2]三峡大学电气与新能源学院,湖北宜昌443002

出　　处：《南方电网技术》2023年第4期101-108,共8页Southern Power System Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(52007103)。

摘　　要：针对传统电网电价垄断模式造成市场积极性不高的现象,提出了基于动态定价的一主多从博弈能源交易模型。通过设立多场景分析综合能源系统中配电网运营商和虚拟电厂之间的能源交易量,求出Stackelberg博弈纳什均衡解。在博弈过程中,配电网运营商作为领导者负责汇总虚拟电厂的交易电量,通过考虑虚拟电厂的价格响应行为决定交易电价从而最大化经济效益。虚拟电厂作为追随者,以最小化运行成本为目标,根据交易电价决定交易电量。同时,提出了Kriging元模型与遗传优化算法相结合的求解方法,在简化计算量的同时求解出双方的均衡解。最后通过算例分析证明,所提博弈模型和优化算法能够在提高求解效率的同时提高双方经济效益。In view of the phenomenon of low market enthusiasm caused by the traditional power grid electricity price monopoly model,this paper proposes an energy trading model of one leader with multi-followers based on dynamic pricing.The Stackelberg game Nash equilibrium solution between distribution network operators and virtual power plants is obtained by setting up multiple scenarios to analyze the energy trading volume between them in integrated energy system.During the game,the distribution network operator,as the leader,is responsible for summarizing the transaction electricity of the virtual power plant.Then the distribution network operator decides the transaction price by considering the price response behavior of the virtual power plant to maximize the economic benefits.Virtual power plants as followers,in order to minimize operating costs as the goal,according to the transaction price to determine the transaction electricity.At the same time,a solution method combining Kriging meta-model and genetic optimization algorithm is proposed to solve the equilibrium solution of both sides while simplifying the calculation.Finally,an example is given to prove that the proposed game model and optimization algorithm can not only improve the solving efficiency,but also improve the economic benefits of both parties.

关 键 词：动态定价 一主多从 STACKELBERG博弈 Kriging元模型 虚拟电厂 

分 类 号：TM743[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]