信息谎报对再制造闭环供应链决策的影响  

Impact of information misreporting on decision-making of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain

作　　者：丁斌[1] 朱玉杰 DING Bin;ZHU Yujie(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,Anhui,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《山东大学学报（理学版）》2023年第5期84-100,共17页Journal of Shandong University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72001199)。

摘　　要：在对称和不对称信息下建立了包含制造商、零售商的决策模型,用Stackelberg博弈理论求解该模型,分析再造品认知度、回收努力及谎报因子对供应链的影响,并探讨最优谎报策略。研究发现:再造品认知度的提升不仅有利于供应链整体利益,也促进了资源的循环利用;回收努力对供应链利润的影响与回收努力成本系数有关;制造商适当谎报低水平信息(谎报因子小于1且大于特定阈值)能提升自身利润;制造商适当谎报高水平信息(谎报因子大于1且小于特定阈值)会降低自身利润;但供应链利润得到了提升,因此零售商有动力设计补贴机制来激励制造商适当谎报高水平信息。A decision model including a manufacturer and a retailer is established under symmetric and asymmetric information.Stackelberg game theory is used to solve the model.The impact of the recognition of remanufactured products,collection efforts,and lied factor on the supply chain are studied,and the optimal misreporting strategy is explored.The results show that the improvement in the recognition of remanufactured products increase the profit of supply chain and promotes the recycling of resources.The impact of collection effort on the supply chain is related to the cost coefficient.The manufacturer increases the profit by misreporting low level information(lied factor is less than 1 and greater than a certain threshold).The manufacturer reduces the profit by misreporting high level information(lied factor is greater than 1 and less than a certain threshold),but increase the profit of the supply chain.Therefore,the retailer has an incentive to design subsidy mechanisms to encourage the manufacturer to report high levels of remanufacturing.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 再制造 信息谎报 再造品认知度 回收努力 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]