有限理性下养老问题的四方博弈演化动力学模型研究  

Research on Evolutionary Dynamics Model of Four-Party Game of the Elderly Care Problem Under Bounded Rationality

作　　者：胡黎秘 丘小玲 HU Li-mi;QIU Xiao-ling(School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China)

机构地区：[1]贵州大学数学与统计学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2023年第5期48-66,共19页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(12061020);贵州省教育厅科学基金(黔科合KY字[2021]088号);贵州省科技厅科学基金(黔科合-ZK[2021]一般331);贵州省科技厅科学基金(黔科合基础[2019]1123号);贵州大学引进人才基金(201811)。

摘　　要：随着中国人口老龄化的发展,养老问题逐渐成为一个重要话题,而养老机构作为解决养老问题的一个重要途径其监管问题越显重要.在有限理性下,构建政府、第三方评估机构、养老机构和老年人四方演化博弈模型,考虑可能存在的寻租现象,分析各博弈主体的动态演化过程,利用MATLAB仿真分析不同要素对各博弈主体策略选择的影响,验证模型分析的有效性,最后为完善养老服务系统、提高养老服务质量提出了合理的建议.With the development of the aging population in China,the issue of elderly care has gradually become an important topic.Elderly institutions is an important way to solve the problem of elderly care,and its supervision is becoming more and more important.Based on bounded rationality,this paper constructs a four party evolutionary game model of government,third-party assessment institution,elderly institution and the elderly,considers the rent-seeking phenomenon that may exist in the supervision process,and analyzes the dynamic evolution process of each player.MATLAB is used for simulation to analyze the infuence of different factors on the strategy selection of each player,and verifies the validity of the model analysis.Finally,reasonable suggestions are put forward to improve the elderly care service system and improve the quality of elderly care services.

关 键 词：养老服务质量 四方博弈 演化稳定策略 复制动力学 

分 类 号：F719[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32