"政银保"模式下政府激励对小微企业信贷的影响机制研究  

Research on the Influence Mechanism of Government Incentives on Credit of Small and Micro Enterprises Under“Government-Bank-Insurance”Mode

作　　者：徐维军[1] 陈琪琪 杨保军[2] XU Wei-jun;CHEN Qi-qi;YANG Bao-jun(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China;School of Business,North Minzu University,Yinchuan 750001,China)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640 [2]北方民族大学商学院,宁夏银川750001

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2023年第5期67-80,共14页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：广东省基础与应用基础研究基金(2022A1515010224);宁夏哲学社会科学重点项目(21NXAGL02);广州金融服务创新与风险管理研究基地项目(PTJS202204)。

摘　　要：受2020年新冠疫情影响,小微企业融资难的问题更为严峻.政府作为"政银保"模式的发起者,其不同激励手段和激励程度对企业信贷业务的影响是不同的.因此,在前人研究的基础上,结合"政银保"模式在小微企业信贷领域的发展情况,构建不同激励政策下涵盖商业银行、小微企业和保险公司的三方演化博弈模型,在均衡求解、稳定性说明和算例仿真的基础上,重点对比不同政策对系统演化和信贷业务运行的影响机制;最后,结合实际政策进行案例仿真分析,为"政银保"模式有序运行提出对策建议.研究表明:信用体系建设是小微企业信贷风险管理的关键;贷款贴息、保费补贴和贷款本金风险补偿政策都能促进系统向均衡点演化,降低保险比例,贷款贴息敏感性最高,保费补贴敏感性呈边际递减,贷款本金补偿敏感性最低,超赔风险补偿对系统均衡无明显作用.Affected by COVID-19 in 2020,it has become more and more difficult for small and micro businesses to raise funds.As the initiator of the"Government-Bank-Insurance"model,government's different incentive means and incentive degree have different influence on enterprise credit business.Therefore,on the basis of previous studies,combined with the development of"Government-Bank-Insurance"model in the field of small and micro businesses credit,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model covering commercial banks,small and micro businesses and insurance companies under different incentive policies.On the basis of equilibrium solution,stability explanation and example simulation,this paper focuses on comparing the impact mechanism of different policies on system evolution and creditbusiness operation;Finally,combined with the actual policy,a simulation example is given to put forward countermeasures and suggestions for the orderly operation of the"Government-Bank-Insurance"mode.The research shows that the construction of credit system is the key to credit risk management of small and micro businesses;Loan discount,premium subsidy and loan principal risk compensation policies can promote the evolution of the system to the equilibrium point and reduce the proportion of insurance.The sensitivity of loan discount isthe highest,the sensitivity of premium subsidy shows marginal reduction,and the sensitivity of loan principal compensation is the lowest.Over compensation risk compensation has no obvious effect on the balance of the system.

关 键 词："政银保"模式 政府激励 小微企业 三方演化博弈 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F276.3[政治法律—政治学] D630[政治法律—中外政治制度]