完全私有化企业与部分私有化企业博弈的动力学分析  

Dynamic analysis of the duopoly game between fully privatized firm and partially privatized firm

作　　者：刘方楠 周伟[1] LIU Fangnan;ZHOU Wei(School of Mathematics and Physics,Lanzhou Jiaotong University,Lanzhou 730070,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州交通大学数理学院,甘肃兰州730070

出　　处：《陕西理工大学学报（自然科学版）》2023年第3期69-78,共10页Journal of Shaanxi University of Technology:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(61863022);中国博士后科学基金项目(2017M623276)。

摘　　要：为了研究完全私有化企业与部分私有化企业生产同质产品时在市场博弈中的动力学行为,基于有限理性建立了双寡头博弈模型。利用非线性动力学理论和Jury判据分析了系统中4个均衡点的稳定性条件;通过一维分岔图、分岔曲线图、吸引盆等分析了授权成本、生产成本、企业的调整速度以及私有化程度对系统稳定性的影响以及演化过程。研究显示:较大的授权成本、较小的生产成本对企业的市场发展有利,而极端的调整速度及私有化程度都对企业的稳定发展不利。To study the dynamic behavior of fully privatized firm and partially privatized firm in the market game when they produce homogeneous products,a duopoly game model is established based on bounded rationality.The stability conditions of four equilibrium points in the system are analyzed by nonlinear dynamics theory and Jury criterion.The influence of licensing cost,production cost,adjustment speed and privatization degree on system stability and the evolution process are analyzed by the one-dimensional bifurcation diagrams,bifurcation curve diagram,the basin of attraction and so on.Research shows that larger licensing cost and smaller production cost are beneficial to the market development of enterprises,while extreme adjustment speed and privatization degree are unfavorable to the stable development of enterprises.

关 键 词：消费者剩余 部分私有化 共存吸引子 吸引盆 混沌 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]