行政检查、行政约谈能提升平台规制的效果吗?--基于网约车平台的“大数据+准实验”研究  

Do Administrative Inspections and Administrative Interviews Enhance the Effect of Government Regulation on the Platform Economy?A Big Data Analysis of a Quasi-experiment Based on a Ride-Hailing Platform

作　　者：刘若玄 樊博[1] Ruoxuan Liu;Bo Fan

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院

出　　处：《公共行政评论》2023年第3期42-59,196,共19页Journal of Public Administration

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目“面向复杂公共事务的跨组织与跨机构协同机制研究”(72134005);国家自然科学基金面上项目“大数据分析驱动的农产品质量安全治理研究”(71974128);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“基于大数据分析的重大公共事务决策风险治理研究”(19JZD022)。

摘　　要：平台经济在我国经济社会发展全局中的地位和作用日益凸显,它为公众提供便捷、高效的同时,也蕴含着新的风险。如何防范化解风险,促进平台经济行稳致远的发展,从而更好地保护公众利益,是我国政府高度重视的问题。然而,既有研究尚未对政府如何在平台规制中发挥作用这一问题提供充分的论证与解释。围绕平台经济发展中的社会性风险这一议题,基于回应性规制理论下的威慑与遵从逻辑,研究采用“大数据+准实验”的设计思路,将网约车监管中的行政检查、行政约谈作为政策干预变量,以公众微博文本中挖掘的情感得分为结果变量,利用间断时间序列分析方法对政府规制效果进行检验。研究发现:(1)行政检查基于强制与惩罚对平台产生了威慑效果,行政约谈通过劝服与对话促成了平台的遵从行为,二者均能有效提升平台规制的效果,干预当期政策效应显著但不具有长效性;(2)行政检查、行政约谈的政策效应存在差异,规制手段强制力的高低对规制效果产生了不同程度的影响,威慑性规制的效果更为稳健。研究将全面的回应性规制框架扩展到平台规制这一新兴技术治理领域,丰富了回应性规制理论的本土化研究,为从公众评价的角度研究政策效果提供了新的思路。研究证明,行政约谈与行政检查的协同互补,能够形成更强大的政策合力,从而有利于风险的防范与治理,这为平台监管机制的完善提供了一定的政策启示。The platform economy plays a prominent role in China's economic and social development.In providing convenience and efficiency to the public,it also contains new risks.The Chinese government has always sought to prevent and mitigate these risks to promote the long-term development of the platform economy and to better protect the public interest.Although the existing literature shows how the government might implement effective regulation,there is a lack of argumentation and explanation.Inspired by the perspectives of regulatory deterrence and compliance to cope with rising social risks of the platform economy,this study adopted a“big data+quasi-experiment”research design to examine the effect of government regulation on ride-hailing platforms.In conducting the Interrupted Time Series Analyses(ITSA),administrative inspection and interview were taken as policy interventions,sentiment scores that extracted from Weibo posts are used as the outcome variables.The empirical results show that administrative inspection achieves a deterrent effect due to its coerciveness and punitiveness,and the administrative interview promotes compliance through dialogue and persuasion.Both of the interventions significantly brought immediate effects of regulation,while long-term effects are not significant.Further,there exist differences in the effects of administrative inspection and interview on account of the different degree of coerciveness.Regulatory effects depending on the coerciveness of regulatory tools proved to have a more robust effect of deterrence.This study enriches the localization research of responsive regulation theory,and extends a comprehensive framework of responsive regulation to platform regulation,a field of emerging technology governance.A new approach to evaluation of regulatory effects from the perspective of public opinion is also provided.Moreover,this study demonstrates that more powerful resultant forces,from the coordination and complementarity of administrative interviews and administrative inspect

关 键 词：平台规制 行政检查 行政约谈 规制效果 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学]