权势转移时期霸权国战略收缩的“双刃剑”效应  

The“Double-Edged Sword”Effect of Hegemonic Power sStrategic Retrenchment during Power Transition Period

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作  者:冯雨 Feng Yu

机构地区:[1]中国人民大学国际关系学院

出  处:《印度洋经济体研究》2023年第3期23-44,151,152,共24页Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review

摘  要:战略收缩是霸权国调控衰落的重要方式,但是战略收缩通常不会以线性方式发生作用,权势转移时期对霸权国自身看似合理的低成本政策有可能为全球政治注入负动能。既有研究有着全面肯定或否定战略收缩效应的两种相反倾向,但少有研究对其潜在的双重效应进行阐释或分析。本文为权势转移时期霸权国的战略收缩双重效应的生成机理提出了一个分析框架,通过对一战前英国战略收缩的案例分析,发现霸权国激进式战略收缩可能因为战略手段、行为体与环境三个层次上的互动效应而产生难以预料的结果,不仅为崛起国造成超出预期的战略压力,也加剧了自身被盟友牵连的风险。探究霸权国战略收缩生成双重效应的机理,有助于我们研判当下美国战略收缩的局限性。Strategic retrenchment is an important approach for hegemonic powers to regulate their decline.However,retrenchment typically cannot be explained by a linear model.Policies that seems reasonable and low-cost to the hegemonic power during power transition may inject negative dynamics into global politics.Existing research exhibits two opposing tendencies in fully affirming or negating the effectiveness of strategic retrenchment,while its dual effects has have been rarely explicated and analyzed.This article proposes an explanatory framework for the dual effects of strategic retrenchment of hegemonic powers during power transition periods.Through an examination of Britain s strategic retrenchment prior before World War I,this study demonstrates that the radical strategic retrenchment of a hegemonic power,influenced by the interactive effects at three levels including strategic method,actor,and context,can lead to unpredictable outcomes,imposing greater pressure on the ascending power than anticipated and amplifying the risk of entanglements with allies.Exploring the underlying mechanisms of the dual effects generated by the strategic retrenchment of hegemonic powers could help us understand the limitations of the current U.S.retrenchment strategy.

关 键 词:战略收缩 战略竞争 双重效应 “修昔底德陷阱” 

分 类 号:D81[政治法律—国际关系]

 

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