CEO自恋与审计师风险应对:来自CEO签字的经验证据  

CEO Narcissism and Auditors Resonance to Audit Risk:Evidencefrom CEO Signatures

作　　者：武恒光[1] 张龙平[2] WU Hengguang;ZHANG Longping(School of Accounting,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China;School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,济南250014 [2]中南财经政法大学会计学院,武汉430073

出　　处：《管理科学》2023年第1期90-105,共16页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金(ZR2022MG01);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(16YJC790110)。

摘　　要：自恋在组织行为尤其是领导力方面具有强大的解释力,得到心理学和组织行为学等多个学科领域学者的高度关注。近期战略管理领域学者基于高阶管理理论和自恋属性,提供了高管自恋影响公司决策的证据,尤其是相关研究从公司投资、并购和舞弊等角度研究高管自恋的组织后果,发现自恋型管理层倾向强化冒险回报敏感性。然而,审计师作为公司财务报告的鉴证者,尚未有研究检验CEO自恋对审计师风险应对决策行为的影响。以心理学的自恋理论为基础,基于2006年至2017年中国A股上市公司数据,手工收集上市公司招股说明书中CEO签字数据,运用CEO签字大小测量CEO自恋程度,检验CEO自恋对审计师风险应对决策行为的影响机制。采用变动分析、工具变量和更换CEO自恋测量指标等方法验证研究结果的稳健性。研究结果表明,CEO自恋程度越高,审计费用越高,审计师出具非标准审计意见的概率越大。机制分析发现,高自恋程度CEO具有更高概率的违规和财务重述行为,呈现出显著的审计延迟现象,意味着自恋型CEO运营公司的固有风险和控制风险居高不下,审计师识别出自恋型CEO引发的重大错报风险,执行了高成本的审计程序;高自恋程度CEO具有更大幅度的正向盈余管理,意味着虽然审计师提高审计强度查找重大错报,但自恋型CEO并未倾向于接受审计调整,从而被出具非标准审计意见的概率增加。拓展分析发现,CEO越自恋,在低声誉事务所和较差的法制环境中,越不倾向于变更事务所,该现象对事务所的市场份额高增长具有一定解释力;但CEO自恋程度越高,更换审计师频次越高,更倾向于聘请执业经验不丰富的审计师,该现象能够在一定程度上解释事务所遭受监管处罚的原因。将CEO自恋人格特征产生的影响拓展到审计领域,延伸高管自恋的经济后果研究,并拓宽审计定价和审计意见决Narcissism has a strong explanatory power in the field of organizational behavior,especially leadership,which has received wide interest from researchers in many academic disciplines such as psychology and organizational behavior.Re-cently,based on the upper echelons theory and the attributes of narcissism,a growing body of literature in the domain of stra-tegic management provides evidences that narcissistic top managers affect firm-related decisions.Specifically,studies have ex-amined the effect of top managers'narcissism on corporate investment,M&A and financial fraudulence,and have found some interesting results that narcissistic managers tend to reinforce the sensitivity to the rewards of risk taking.The firm's external auditor is an important counter-party,yet little is known about the effects of CEO narcissism on audit engagement teams'risk-responsedecisions.Based on the narcissism theory of psychology,using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2017,and utilizing the size of CEO signatures manually collected in prospectus filings to measure individual narcissism,we study the mechanism of CEO narcissism affecting auditors'decisions.We perform a series of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our findings by applying methods such as change analysis test,instrumental variable test,and replacing CEO narcissism meas-ures.We find that CEO narcissism has an economically and statistically positive effect on modified audit opinion and external audit fee.Mechanism analysis shows that narcissistic CEOs are associated with higher possibility of penalty for violation of regulations,and firms headed by narcissistic CEOs experience greater probability of restatements and audit delays.The results highlight the importance of CEO characteristics in the process of evaluating inherent risk and control risk and hence the audit effort decision and audit opinion decision.Moreover,we reveal that CEO narcissism is associated with more positive earnings management,suggesting that although CPAs increase t

关 键 词：CEO自恋 CEO签字 审计意见 审计费用 审计师变更 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]