中央环保督察下的企业污染监管三方演化博弈与仿真分析  

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Corporate Pollution Regulation under Central Environmental Supervision

作　　者：胡敏[1] 王周鸿 HU Min;WANG Zhouhong(School of Information Management,Beijing Information Science and Technology University,Beijing 100192)

机构地区：[1]北京信息科技大学信息管理学院,北京100192

出　　处：《管理现代化》2023年第3期134-144,共11页Modernization of Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金青年项目“基于空间外溢与门槛效应的制造业绿色技术创新能力研究”(20YJC630056)。

摘　　要：中央环保督察是加强地方政府落实环境保护主体责任的重要措施,征收环境保护税以及制定环保专项资金管理办法是促使企业减少排放的有力手段。基于演化博弈理论,构建中央环保督察组、地方政府和排污企业参与的三方演化博弈模型,分析博弈策略演化路径。以环保督察试点省份河北省为案例,通过数值仿真分析博弈主体之间的策略演化过程,以及环保税收优惠率、企业获得的环保专项补助资金金额以及环保专项资金收回比例对博弈系统演化的影响。三方博弈存在若干演化结果,数值仿真后的初始博弈均衡结果为环保督察组监管、地方政府严格监管以及排污企业不减排。通过博弈均衡点移动分析可知:采取环保专项资金收回策略,并将收回比例提高到阈值以上可以促成环保督察组监管、地方政府严格监管以及排污企业减排的最优策略;增加企业获得的环保专项补助资金有助于企业向实施减排的策略方向演化。通过对约束变量的敏感性分析发现,降低企业减排的额外成本、给予企业环保税收优惠以及提高企业减排后的收益也可以促使博弈初始结果向最优策略转变。Central environmental inspection(CEI)is a crucial measure for enhancing local government accountability in implementing environmental protection.Imposing environmental protection taxes and establishing special funds for environmental management are effective tools for incentivizing enterprises to reduce pollution emissions.This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving CEI teams,local governments,and enterprises based on evolutionary game theory,analyzing the evolutionary path of game strategies.Using Hebei Province as a case study,a numerical simulation is conducted to examine the process of strategy evolution among the three game players and determine evolutionary stabilization strategies.The rate of environmental protection tax incentives,the amount of special environmental protection subsidies received by enterprises,and the percentage of special environmental protection funds recovered are identified as key factors influencing the evolution of the game system.The initial game equilibrium result of the numerical simulation for the three-party game indicates regulation by inspection teams,strict regulation by local governments,and no emission reduction by enterprises.Analysis of the shift in game equilibrium points reveals that adopting the strategy of recovering the environmental protection special fund and increasing the recovery ratio above a certain threshold can lead to the optimal strategy,which involves supervision by environmental protection inspectors,strict oversight by local governments,and emission reduction by enterprises.Increasing the special environmental protection subsidies received by enterprises facilitates their evolution towards implementing emission reduction strategies.Sensitivity analysis of constraint variables demonstrates that reducing the additional cost of emission reduction,increasing environmental tax incentives,and enhancing the benefits of reducing emissions can also drive a shift towards the optimal strategy.

关 键 词：污染监管 政企博弈 三方演化博弈 演化稳定策略 环保督察 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学] N945.12[自然科学总论—系统科学] N945.13