风险投资的政府背景与公司IPO效率  

Government-backed venture capitals and IPO efficiency

作　　者：苗萌 左正禹 颜晓 MIAO Meng;ZUO Zhengyu;YAN Xiao(School of Finance,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;School of Economics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872 [2]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2023年第4期1002-1021,共20页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项)(16XNF012)。

摘　　要：作为我国资本市场事前监管的重要环节,股票发行核准制度对上市公司进行了筛选,但也增加了公司上市融资的隐性成本.本文基于2010–2020年经核准制申请首发上市的公司微观数据,实证检验了风险投资的政府背景对公司上市时长的影响.研究结果表明:有政府背景的风险投资能够缩短被投企业的上会等待期5个月左右,提升了公司的上市效率.当风险投资的关联政府级别更高、对企业持股比例更大时,政府背景的影响程度更强.机制分析发现,在针对发行审核的改革后和审核委员面临腐败调查期间的时期,该影响减弱,表明政府背景风险投资是通过发审委对关联企业的偏袒效应而发挥作用.该现象不能被信息不对称的缓解,以及公司创新或盈利能力的提升所解释.本文的研究结论对于IPO注册制改革具有参考价值.As a crucial part of ex-ante capital market regulation,the stock issuance review system in China screens firms,but also brings hidden costs for firm financing.By analyzing companies that applied for initial public listing(IPO)during 2010–2020,this paper studies the impact of government-backed venture capital(VC)on the time cost of going public.The results show that investment from government-backed venture capital can shorten the wait period by about five months,significantly improving the IPO efficiency.The influence is stronger when VCs are affiliated with the higher-level government,and when VCs hold a higher share of the company.The effect is weakened after the IPO review reform and when the review committee faces corruption investigations,suggesting that the underlying mechanism is through the favoritism effect on affiliated firms.The phenomenon cannot be explained by the alleviation of information asymmetry or the increase in firm innovation or profitability.The findings of this paper are informative for IPO registration reform.

关 键 词：风险投资 IPO等待期 政府背景 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学] C939[经济管理—管理学]