具有冲突提议者的讨价还价模型及其均衡分析  

Bargaining with conflicting proposers

作　　者：刘佳 王先甲[1,2] LIU Jia;WANG Xianjia(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China;Institute of Systems Engineering,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]武汉大学系统工程研究所,武汉430072

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2023年第4期1145-1155,共11页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72031009);国家社会科学基金(20&ZD058)。

摘　　要：我们研究了一个两人无限轮次的动态讨价还价模型.该模型中,每一轮的提议者是内生确定的,两个参与者在每一轮都可以决定是否进行提议成为提议者.我们分别探讨了满足平稳性的对称混合策略子博弈完美均衡和非对称的纯策略子博弈完美均衡的存在性及其具体形式.平稳的对称混合策略子博弈完美均衡存在且唯一,且该均衡中的参与者在期望意义下至少需要经过两轮博弈之后才能达成协议.提议成本会降低参与者的提议概率,增加分配给自身的提议和降低自身均衡收益.两个满足平稳性的非对称纯策略子博弈完美均衡为极端均衡.其中,一个参与者始终提议分配给自己全部收益,另一个参与者始终不进行提议,并接受任意形式的提议.即使在存在(固定的或者可变的)提议成本的情况下,满足平稳性的纯策略子博弈完美均衡中也不存在延迟达成协议的行为.相比于对称的平稳混合策略子博弈完美均衡,极端均衡更有效.本文的研究为预测协商中冲突的产生概率和达成协议所需的时间提供了理论依据.We study a two-person dynamic bargaining game with infinite rounds.In this game,the proposer of each round is endogenously determined,and two participants can decide whether to make a proposal to become the proposer in each round.We discuss the existence and specific forms of a stationary symmetric mixed-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium and two stationary asymmetric pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibra,respectively.We find that the stationary symmetric mixed-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium exists and is unique.In the sense of expectation,it takes at least two rounds of games to reach an agreement in this equilibrium.The proposal cost will reduce the proposal probability of the participants,increase the proposals allocated to themselves and reduce the benefits of their equilibrium.Extreme equilibria are two pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria,in which one player always proposes to distribute all the benefits to himself,while the other player never makes any offer and accepts any offer.Even in the case of fixed or variable offer costs,there is no delay in reaching agreement in any extreme equilibria.Compared with the stationary symmetric mixed-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium,extreme equilibrium is more effective.This study provides a theoretical basis for predicting the probability of conflict and the time needed to reach an agreement in negotiation.

关 键 词：讨价还价 冲突提议者 延迟 平稳的子博弈完美均衡 极端均衡 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]