认罪认罚从宽制度中腐败滋生风险探究  

Study on the Risk of Corruption in the System of Leniency on Admission of Guilty and Acceptance of Punishment

作　　者：侯英龙 HOU Ying-long(School of Law,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院,北京海淀100084

出　　处：《天水行政学院学报（哲学社会科学版）》2023年第3期113-118,共6页Journal of Tianshui College of Administration

摘　　要：熟识的场合中,个人利益依靠“人情”联系起来的人际关系仅凭借个体的力量难以得到实现,因而“互助”成为潜在规则,对国家制度造成破坏。非熟识的场合中,除非行贿、受贿的预期损失极大并超出双方各自的预期利益,否则博弈双方更倾向于做出行贿、受贿之决策。足够强大的腐败规制力量是权力拥有者拒绝走向腐败的最后一道防护门,现行法律、司法解释及检察机关主导作用下认罪认罚从宽程序为腐败的滋生留下空间。In familiar situations,it is difficult to realize personal interests by relying on the interpersonal relationship linked by“human feelings”.Therefore,“mutual assistance”has become a potential rule,causing damage to the public system.In unfamiliar situations,both sides of the game are more inclined to make the decision of bribery or bribery unless the expected losses of bribery or bribery are extremely large and exceed their respective expected benefits.A sufficiently strong corruption regulation force is the last door of protection for the power owner to refuse to go to corruption.The current laws,judicial interpretations and the lenient procedure of confession and punishment under the leading role of the procuratorate leave room for the breeding of corruption.

关 键 词：认罪认罚从宽 腐败 和合性文化 博弈 

分 类 号：D914[政治法律—刑法学]