中概股退市风险下双重股权制度的不足及完善  

The dilemma and its relief on dual-class share structure under the delisting risk of US-listed Chinese shares

作　　者：黄思瑶 HUANG Siyao(School of Economics and Law,East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 200042,China)

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学经济法学院,上海200042

出　　处：《福建农林大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2023年第3期106-112,共7页Journal of Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：在中概股退市风险下,双重股权制度成为中概股企业决定二次上市地的关键考量因素。实践中,双重股权制度存在立法缺位,规范机制不足,信息披露制度漏洞颇多,配套的社会信用机制及行业自治规范缺乏等问题。鉴于此,在内部治理方面,应设置合理的双重股权架构,灵活适用时间型日落条款,发挥独立董事的监督作用;在外部监管方面,应构建信息披露配套机制,完善社会征信体系,推动过程监管以促进行业自治。Under the delisting risk,dual-class share structure becomes the key factor to determine the secondary listing place of US-traded Chinese companies.In practice,dual-class share structure suffers from a low level of legislation,a lack of regulatory mechanism,many loopholes in the information disclosure system,and a lack of supporting social credit mechanism and industry autonomy norms.In view of this,in terms of internal governance,reasonable dual-class share structure should be set up,time-based sunset clause should be flexibly applied,and independent directors should play a supervisory role.In terms of external supervision,information disclosure supporting mechanism should be constructed,social credit system should be improved,and process supervision should be advanced to promote industry autonomy.

关 键 词：中概股 双重股权制度 日落条款 信息披露 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]