地方政府竞争行为异化:人才竞争何以转变为人口竞争  

Behavioral Alienation of Local Government Competition:Why does Talent Competition Transform into Population Competition

作　　者：郎玫[1] 赵亚鹏 李雨珈 LANG Mei;ZHAO Ya-peng;LI Yu-jia(School of Management,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000;School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州大学管理学院 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2023年第5期15-27,共13页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71904070);中央高校优秀青年支持项目(21LZUJBKYJH009)。

摘　　要：中国高质量发展的战略部署要求地方政府间关系摆脱传统的要素和制度竞争模式,转化为以跨区域为基础、以合作为核心的协同关系。然而,现实中地方政府间关系却展现出高度同质化的恶性竞争和行为异化。基于此,以“营改增”政策为财政压力冲击,分析中国式分权制度下经济分权阻滞对地方政府人才竞争的影响。研究发现:“营改增”政策会加剧地区间的人才与人口竞争,导致当地人均公共资源和人均环境资源下降;“营改增”政策可通过财政压力传导机制加剧地区间的人口竞争;短期来看,人才引进可提高当地技术水平,长期来看却会造成技术水平下降。The strategic plan of high-quality development in China requires that the relationship among local governments have transformed from factor and institution competition to a collaborative relationship based on cross-region and cooperation.However,in reality,the relationship among local governments exhibits a vicious competition of high homogeneity and behavioral alienation.And so based upon that,the paper used the“replacing business tax with value-added tax”policy as a fiscal pressure shock,and analyzed the impact of economic decentralization on local governments'talent competition under the Chinese-style decentralized system.The research found that,the“replacing business tax with value-added tax”policy would increase the competition of talents and population among regions,and cause a decline in local public resources and environmental resources.Meanwhile,the“replacing business tax with value-added tax”policy might intensify inter-regional population competition through the mechanism of fiscal pressure transmission.Besides,although talent introduction could improve the local skill level in the short term,it might cause a decline in the long term.

关 键 词：高质量发展 地方政府竞争 财政压力 短期绩效 中国式分权 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学] D630[政治法律—政治学]