监管处罚抑制了保险公司的风险承担吗?——来自中国寿险业的实证检验  

Do Regulatory Penalties Restrain Risk-taking of Insurers? An Empirical Test Based on Life Insurance Industry in China

作　　者：卢雨萱 赵桂芹[1] LU Yu-xuan;ZHAO Gui-qin(School of Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2023年第7期106-125,共20页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71973089)。

摘　　要：本文手工整理了2012-2020年中国银保监会公开披露的寿险业行政处罚决定书,从风险承担视角检验监管处罚的有效性。研究发现,监管处罚对寿险公司不同层面风险承担的影响存在显著差异,对公司总体财务风险和投资风险承担没有显著影响,但能显著抑制公司流动性风险,维护保单持有人利益;监管处罚的风险抑制作用在不同规模的寿险公司表现出异质性,因利益驱动大型寿险公司风险承担不降反升,而中小型寿险公司则会受到一定威慑和监督作用,主动降低风险承担水平。此外,不同监管处罚类别和处罚力度对寿险公司不同层面风险承担的影响存在明显差异。Based on the data of administrative penalty decisions of insurance industry publicly disclosed on the official website of CIRC from 2012 to 2020,this paper tests the effectiveness of regulatory penalty from the perspective of company's risk taking.It is found that,there are significant differences in the impact of regulatory penalties on risk taking at different levels of life insurance companies.There is no significant impact on the overall financial and investment risk of the company,but it can significantly suppress the company's liquidity risk and safeguard the interests of policyholders.The risk suppression effect of regulatory penalties exhibits heterogeneity in life insurance companies of different sizes,as interest drives,large life insurance companies increase their risk taking instead of decreasing,while small and medium-sized life insurance companies are deterred and supervised to a certain extent,actively reducing their risk taking level.In addition,there are significant differences in the impact of different types and intensity of regulatory penalties on the risk taking of life insurance companies at different levels.

关 键 词：监管处罚 风险承担 寿险公司 监管失灵 

分 类 号：F842.7[经济管理—保险]