控股股东股权质押、控制权转移与信用利差  

Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledges,Transfer of Control,and Credit Spreads

作　　者：周少甫[1] 叶宁 ZHOU Shaofu;YE Ning(School of Economics,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430000,China)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院,湖北武汉430000

出　　处：《经济与管理》2023年第4期61-71,共11页Economy and Management

摘　　要：利用中国A股上市公司2010—2021年银行间债券市场发行的债务融资工具数据探讨控股股东股权质押与信用利差之间的关系。研究结论表明,控股股东股权质押会导致公司发行债务融资工具信用利差更高。进一步研究发现,这一关系只存在于东部沿海地区、个股股价崩盘风险较高和管理层能力较强的上市公司。通过对公司信息环境质量组和低掏空组的验证,排除了信息假说和掏空假说,验证了控制权转移风险假说的唯一性。The relationship between controlling shareholder equity pledges and credit spreads is studied using data on debt financing instruments issued by Chinese A-share listed companies in the interbank bond market from 2010—2021.The findings indicate that controlling shareholder equity pledges lead to higher credit spreads on debt financing instruments issued by companies.Further study finds that this relationship exists only for listed companies on the eastern coast,with a higher risk of individual stock price collapse and stronger management capacity.The uniqueness of this paper's control transfer risk hypothesis is verified by validating the information hypothesis and the hollowing hypothesis through the quality of the firm's information environment group and the low hollowing group,which are excluded.

关 键 词：股权质押 债务融资工具 银行间债券市场 控制权转移风险 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]