供应链网络结构与博弈均衡分析  

Analysis of Supply Chain Network Structure and Game Equilibrium

作　　者：房艳君 吴梦娜 FANG Yan-jun;WU Meng-na(Business School,Shandong Normal Univeristy,Jinan 250014,China)

机构地区：[1]山东师范大学商学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《系统科学学报》2023年第3期104-108,共5页Chinese Journal of Systems Science

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目(20BJL058)。

摘　　要：本文运用经济网络和动态博弈的相关理论,分析供应链网络中合作均衡出现的必要条件。首先介绍供应链网络结构构成及其特征,运用动态博弈过程中动态演变的思想,把个体利益的大小与网络中的节点连接关系联系起来,运用合作与惩罚下收益现值的比较,寻找供应链网络出现合作均衡的条件。为不失一般性,在分析过程中,首先推导每层只有单个节点的供应链网络均衡条件,进一步推导在具有多个节点的供应链网络结构中的均衡条件。从分析可以得出,网络中的合作均衡受到背叛策略下的最高收益、收益总现值以及折现率的影响,并对三者之间的影响关系进行了描述。This paper analyzed the necessary conditions of cooperative equilibrium in supply chain network based on the theories of economic network and dynamic game.Firstly,the paper introduced the structure and characteristics of supply chain network,connected the size of individual benefit with the connection relation of nodes in the network.It found out the conditions of cooperative equilibrium in the network by comparing the present value of benefits under cooperation and punishment by using the idea of dynamic evolution of dynamic game.Generality,in the analysis process,the network equilibrium conditions with single node in each layer were firstly derived,and the equilibrium conditions in the network structure with multiple nodes were further derived.From the analysis,it could be concluded that the cooperative equilibrium in the network was affected by the maximum return of betrayal,total profit value and the discount rate,the relationship among the three was also described.

关 键 词：博弈均衡 供应链网络 经济网络 复杂网络 

分 类 号：N949[自然科学总论—系统科学] F250[经济管理—国民经济] F272