公众参与视角下的中央-地方-企业环境规制演化博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Central-local-enterprise Environmental Regulation Evolution from the Perspective of Public Participation

作　　者：潘峰 刘月 王琳[2] PAN Feng;LIU Yue;WANG Lin(School of Public Administration and Humanities,Dalian Maritime University,Dalian 116026,China;School of Economics and Management(Tourism),Dalian University,Dalian 116622,China)

机构地区：[1]大连海事大学公共管理与人文艺术学院,辽宁大连116026 [2]大连大学经济管理(旅游)学院,辽宁大连116622

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第6期104-110,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(22YJC630138);国家社会科学基金一般项目(22BGL013);大连市社科联基金重点项目(2022dlskzd345);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(3132023348);大连大学创新创业训练计划(D202203081924352960)。

摘　　要：中国环境治理体系的相关主体主要为中央政府、地方政府和企业,随着公众参与意识的日益增强,参与环境治理的程度也在不断提高。本文首先构建了中央政府-地方政府-企业三方环境规制演化博弈模型,在此基础上引入公众参与相关参数,运用仿真分析比较公众参与对原复制动力系统相关主体策略选择的影响。研究表明:引入相关参数可以更快实现系统均衡;针对公众实施的环保政策效果要优于针对地方政府和企业实施的环保政策效果;公众举报奖励与系统稳态存在倒“U”型关系。公众参与是改善治污效果的重要途径,对于提高地方政府积极执行环境规制、约束企业非法排污以及实现经济发展的同时保护生态环境具有重要作用。In China,the relevant subjects of the environmental governance system are mainly the central government,local governments and enterprises.In recent years,with the continuous progress of industrialization,the problem of environmental pollution has become increasingly serious.Pollution incidents in some areas have occurred repeatedly,especially haze,water pollution and other problems,which have aroused public concern and participation in the environmental crisis.The increasing awareness of public participation has led to the continuous improvement of the degree of public participation in environmental governance,which leads to the question of whether public participation will affect the strategic choices of the relevant subjects of environmental governance,and if so,what is the extent of its impact? The comparative analysis of public participation in the basic tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental regulation in the form of parameters can answer this question clearly and intuitively,and at the same time,it has important practical significance on how to stably play the role of public participation in environmental governance,control the uncertainty of public participation as much as possible,and then optimize the environmental governance strategies of relevant subjects and improve the efficiency of environmental governance.First of all,taking the mainstream forces in the environmental governance system—the central government,local governments and enterprises as the main body,this paper constructs a basic framework of a tripartite evolutionary game model,and explores how the three parties choose environmental regulation strategies without considering public factors.Then,on the basis of the above model,the relevant parameters of public participation are introduced to construct a central-local-enterprise tripartite evolutionary game model under public participation to investigate the influence mechanism of public participation on environmental governance.Finally,drawing lessons from the parameter setting

关 键 词：公众参与 环境规制 演化博弈 仿真 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]