职工社会保险的强制性与监管激励--以生育保险为例的实证研究  

The Mandatory and Regulation Incentives of Urban Employee Social Insurance--An Empirical Study on Maternity Insurance as an Example

作　　者：杨攀续 Yang Panxu

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《财政科学》2023年第6期89-103,共15页Fiscal Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“积极应对人口老龄化的社会养老服务制度城乡统筹和区域协调发展战略研究”(项目编号:21AZD076)。

摘　　要：正向激励是地方监管部门落实职工社会保险强制性的前提。本文选择生育保险作为典型研究对象进行面板门槛模型分析,通过实证生育保险的覆盖面与基金收支的关系反映地方监管部门落实职工社会保险强制性面临的监管激励。研究发现,存在一个门槛值使得生育保险的强制性和监管激励呈现非线性关系;当生育保险的强制性越过门槛值后,落实强制性会使得地方监管部门面临人均基金收入减少的负向激励;当某地生育保险基金收支结构较差时,落实生育保险强制性带来的负向激励将更加明显。当前尚不存在正向激励促使地方监管部门主动落实生育保险的强制性。探索建立覆盖灵活就业人员的生育保险制度需要处理好负向激励问题。Positive incentives are the premise for regulators to actively supervise urban employee social insurance.This paper selects maternity insurance as the object,and uses the panel threshold model to analyze the data.This paper uses the coverage of maternity insurance and the income and expenditure of the per capita maternity insurance fund to represent the compulsion of maternity insurance and the incentive to the management agency,respectively.The study found that different management difficulties lead to a threshold that makes the relationship between the mandatory of maternity insurance and the incentives to the regulatory authority is nonlinear.When the mandatory of maternity Insurance exceeds the threshold,the regulatory authority will be negatively motivated by the reduction of per capita fund income.When the income and expenditure structure of the maternity insurance fund in a certain place is poor,the negative incentives generated by the compulsory implementation of maternity insurance will be more obvious.There is no positive incentive that can make the regulatory authority takes the initiative to strengthen the mandatory of maternity insurance.To explore the establishment of a maternity insurance system covering flexible employees needs to deal with the problem of negative incentives faced by regulatory agencies.

关 键 词：社会保险 生育保险 监管激励 门槛效应 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]