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作 者:王玉燕[1,2] 杨振龙 申亮 Wang Yuyan;Yang Zhenlong;Shen Liang(School of Management Science and Engineering,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China;School of Business,Shandong Normal University,Jinan 250014,China;School of Public Finance and Taxation,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China)
机构地区:[1]山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山东济南250014 [2]山东师范大学商学院,山东济南250014 [3]山东财经大学财政税务学院,山东济南250014
出 处:《系统工程学报》2023年第3期406-418,共13页Journal of Systems Engineering
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971129);山东省泰山学者工程专项资助项目(tsqn202211197)。
摘 要:针对手机捆绑销售中手机供应链的主导权不一致问题,考虑网络外部性的影响,构建不同主导模式的分散决策和集中决策模型,通过比较不同模型下产品价格和成员利润,分析了网络外部性和不同主导模式对决策的影响.研究表明,手机制造商和通讯服务商的利润,以及供应链系统利润与网络外部性系数正相关;在两种分散决策模式下,虽然主导厂商不同,但是两种模式下系统总利润相等.两种分散决策可以通过收益共享联合补贴契约协调手机供应链,实现共赢.Decentralized decision models for different dominant modes and centralized decision models are constructed by considering power structure and network externality in a mobile phone bundle sales supply chain.A comparison of the equilibrium solutions under different models is made to analyze the effects of net-work externality and dominant modes on supply chain operations.The results show that the profits of supply chain members and the system are positively correlated with the network externality coefficient.The total sys-tem profits of the decentralized decision models under different dominant manufacturers are equal.Moreover,the supply chain can be coordinated through the revenue sharing and joint subsidy contract designed in this paper.
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